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AUGUSTINE AND THE EARLY RENAISSANCE*

PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER

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THE INFLUENCE OF AUGUSTINE upon Western thought, which has been vast and profound, has made itself felt in many different forms and directions. This diversity is due not only to the continual change of the intellectual situation which always causes a change in the approach to the great thinkers of the past, but also to a particular complexity in the work of Augustine himself. Before he arrived at his definite position as a Christian theologian, Augustine passed through a number of different stages, and they all left their mark upon his thought and work. As a student and teacher of rhetoric he absorbed the literary tradition of ancient Rome, and this is apparent in the style and content of many of his writings. The heritage of Greek philosophy was known to him through indirect sources, at least, and became an important element of his thought. The impression he received from the reading of Cicero's *Hortensius* is well known, and through Cicero he became acquainted also with the Scepticism of the New Academy, which he made the subject of a serious discussion in the *Contra Academicos,* and to which he also owed a few characteristic aspects of his own philosophical thought. Even more important was the influence of Plato and the Neoplatonists, known to Augustine through Cicero, Apuleius, a Latin version of Plotinus, and perhaps through certain personal contacts. Augustine repeatedly praises the Platonists above all other philosophers, and is indebted to them for many of his metaphysical conceptions. This is especially apparent in his earlier works composed during the period of his conversion. Manichaeism, to which Augustine adhered for a number of years, left its traces in his emphasis on the problems of evil and sin. The profound religious experience of his conversion accounts for the very personal character of his Christianity, which finds a suggestive expression in such works as the *Confessions.* Finally, as a Catholic bishop, he was confronted with many moral and social problems and also in-

* This article is based on a paper read before the Augustinian Society in Cambridge, Mass., on Jan. 16, 1941, and first published in *International Science* 1 (1941), 7-14. The text has now been thoroughly revised, and the footnotes added.

volved in polemic discussions with contemporary heretics, which led him to recapitulate and to complete the theological speculation of St. Paul and the earlier Church Fathers.[1]

All these elements were potential sources of inspiration for the later readers of Augustine's works. The religious and theological element which constitutes the dominating part of Augustine's thought certainly accounts for much of the influence he has exercised upon later times. However, the remaining aspects of his work are responsible for the great influence Augustine had outside the field of theology proper, and especially in the history of philosophy, literature, and education. These latter aspects of Augustine's influence were always significant, and they assumed a particular importance during the period of the Renaissance.

The history of Augustine's "fortune" and influence has not yet been made the subject of an adequate comprehensive study.[2] The basic facts are fairly well known, and a few specific phases and aspects have been studied in greater detail, especially for the earlier Middle Ages, for the Reformation period, and for seventeenth-century France.[3] Augustine's influence on the early Renaissance has so far attracted less attention.[4] It will be our task to show that there actually was such an influence, and

1. From the vast literature on Augustine I mention only: E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1931); P. Alfaric, *L'évolution intellectuelle de Saint Augustin* (Paris, 1918); H. I. Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique* (Paris, 1938); Sister Mary Patricia Garvey, *Saint Augustine: Christian or Neo-Platonist?* (Milwaukee, 1939); E. M. Manasse, "Conversion and Liberation," *Review of Religion*, VII (1943), 361-83; Father J. B. Reeves, "St. Augustine and Humanism," in *A Monument to St. Augustine* (London, 1930), pp. 121-51.

2. A brief survey of Augustine's influence which is now antiquated, is given by J. F. Nourrisson, *La philosophie de Saint Augustin*, vol. II (Paris, 1865), 147-276. The best comprehensive statement is E. Portalié's article, "Augustinisme," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, I, 2501-61.

3. Portalié's article treats especially Augustine's influence on medieval philosophy and on the theological controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the latter with a marked emphasis on the orthodox Catholic position. The article has only a few passing remarks on the influence of Augustine during the Renaissance.

4. The only adequate picture of Augustine's influence during the Renaissance is found in the excellent introduction of N. Abercrombie, *Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 1-17 (see also his chapter on Montaigne, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-56). I find myself in full agreement with most of the statements of Mr. Abercrombie, who emphasizes Augustine's influence on the humanists, Platonists, and Stoics of the Renaissance. There are a number of studies on Augustine's influence on Petrarch, see below. The "Augustinianism" of the Renaissance as conceived by Burdach is a rather nebulous conception, see below.

that it was to some extent significant, for Augustine as well as for the Renaissance.

During the early Middle Ages, Augustine's influence was felt mainly in the field of theology proper.[5] On the other hand, the authority and example of Augustine helped greatly to preserve the heritage of classical learning in the medieval schools of Western Europe.[6] In the eleventh century, when the conflict between Church and State first became acute, both parties made use of Augustinian conceptions for the theoretical defense of their cause, and the influence of the *Civitas Dei* dominated political and historical literature for many centuries thereafter.[7] When philosophical speculation began to develop in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, it was chiefly guided by Augustine, and most of the early Scholastics have been rightly called Augustinians. Before the great translating activity of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the writings of Augustine contained perhaps the most substantial body of philosophical ideas then available in Latin, and not only specific conceptions such as the theories of illumination, of the divine ideas, and of the relation between faith and reason, but also Augustine's entire synthesis of Christian theology and Neoplatonic metaphysics gained an almost general acceptance.[8] During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when

5. Portalié, *loc. cit.*; W. Schulz, *Der Einfluss Augustins in der Theologie und Christologie des VIII. und IX. Jahrhunderts* (Halle, 1913).

6. F. X. Eggersdorfer, *Der heilige Augustinus als Paedagoge und seine Bedeutung für die Geschichte der Bildung* (Freiburg, 1907), pp. 201 ff.; M. Grabmann, "Der Einfluss des heiligen Augustinus auf die Verwertung und Bewertung der Antike im Mittelalter," in his *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, II (Munich, 1936), 1-24; E. K. Rand, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), pp. 251 ff.

7. C. Mirbt, *Die Stellung Augustins in der Publicistik des gregorianischen Kirchenstreits* (Leipzig, 1888); E. Bernheim, "Politische Begriffe des Mittelalters im Lichte der Anschauungen Augustins," *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, N.F. I (VII), (1896-97), 1-23; H. X. Arquillière, *L'Augustinisme politique: Essai sur la formation des théories politiques du moyen âge* (Paris, 1934); U. Mariani, "Le teorie politiche di S. Agostino e il loro influsso negli scrittori teocratici del secolo XIV," *Giornale Dantesco*, XXXIII (N.S. III), (1932), 39-71 (I am indebted for this last reference to Professor G. Prezzolini).

8. On the philosophical Augustinianism of the Middle Ages in general, see Portalié, *loc. cit.* For special aspects see: G. Théry, "L'augustinisme médiéval et le problème de la forme substantielle," in *Mélanges Augustiniens* (Paris, 1931), pp. 330-59; F. Cavallera, "Saint Augustin et le livre des Sentences," *Archives de Philosophie*, VII, no. 2 (1930), 186-99; M. Grabmann, "Des hl. Augustinus Quaestio de Ideis in ihrer inhaltlichen Bedeutung und mittelalterlichen Weiterwirkung," *op. cit.*, 25-34; *Idem*, "Augustins Lehre von Glauben und Wissen und ihr Einfluss auf das mittelalterliche Denken," *op. cit.*, pp. 35-62.

Aristotelianism became predominant among philosophers and theologians, Augustinianism survived as an important secondary current, and even the representatives of Aristotelianism preserved many traces of Augustinian influence.[9]

Other areas of medieval literature that were comparatively immune to the influence of Aristotle remained the more faithful to the spirit of Augustine. This seems to apply especially to the theology of the mystics, and to the broad stream of popular religious, devotional, and ascetical literature.[10] The prominent place Augustine's works held in medieval libraries, and the great number of extant manuscripts which date from the ninth to the fifteenth century, are a direct testimony of their continual and widespread influence,[11] whereas the large number of apocryphal writings that were current under Augustine's name bear testimony to his universal authority and to the kind of ideas and interests then associated with his prestige and influence.[12] Another aspect of Augustine's influence in the Middle Ages was due to the so-called Rule of Augustine, a monastic rule compiled between the eighth and ninth century from the works of Augustine. This rule was officially accepted by the regular or Augustinian Canons after their reorganization in 1059, and by the Augustinian Hermits in 1256, when their scattered congregations were unified into a single mendicant order.[13] It would certainly be a mistake to identify the Augustinianism of the later Middle Ages with the intellectual activities of the Augustinian order, as some scholars have

9. E. Longpré, "S. Augustin et la pensée franciscaine," *La France Franciscaine,* XV (1932), 1-76 (quoted by Grabmann, *op. cit.,* p. 7). The thought of Thomas Aquinas is defined as a synthesis of Aristotle and Augustine by Grabmann (*ibid.,* pp. 46 and 61). For St. Bonaventura as the chief representative of Augustinianism in the thirteenth century, see E. Gilson, *La Philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* (Paris, 1924), pp. 328, 377, 465.

10. Grabmann, *ibid.,* pp. 9, 34, 48. According to Gilson, Augustine's influence on St. Bernard was important, but not decisive, whereas other mystics of Bernard's circle, such as William of Saint-Thierry, were much closer to Augustine (*La Théologie mystique de Saint Bernard,* [Paris, 1934], pp. 45-47, n. 1).

11. A. Wilmart, "La tradition des grands ouvrages de Saint Augustin," in *Miscellanea Agostiniana,* II (Rome, 1931), 257-315.

12. *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke* (GKW) III (Leipzig, 1928), col. 128-80.

13. M. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der katholischen Kirche* (2nd ed.) II (Paderborn, 1907), pp. 7 ff. and 180 ff.

tended to do.[14] The medieval theologians and philosophers of the Augustinian order were not influenced by Augustinianism alone, to the exclusion of Aristotelianism, or even to a larger extent than were some of the other orders, for example, the Franciscans.[15] On the other hand, it is obvious that Augustinian Hermits as well as Augustinian Canons were always eager to cultivate the memory and prestige of their patron saint, and inclined to accept inspiration from his thought and works.[16]

The period of the Renaissance, which we consider to extend approximately from the middle of the fourteenth to the end of the sixteenth century, was in many respects a direct continuation of the Middle Ages. Accordingly, the influence of Augustine during the Renaissance followed in part the same lines taken during the previous period. The Augustinian current in scholastic philosophy and theology can be traced throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.[17] The production of popular religious and ascetical literature was increasing during this period, and many of its ideas and motives may be attributed to the influence and inspiration of Augustine. The orders of the Augustinian

14. K. Werner, *Der Augustinismus in der Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters* (*Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters*, III [Vienna, 1883]) treats chiefly the philosophy of Aegidius Romanus and the other Augustinian Hermits whom he considers as the representatives of Augustinianism proper among the medieval scholastics. K. Burdach goes even further and proceeds to an outright identification of Augustinianism and the Augustinian order ("Zur Kenntnis altdeutscher Handschriften," *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* VIII [1891], 326 f. and 454 ff.). Their victim is Hedwig Venschott's *Geistiges Leben im Augustinerorden am Ende des Mittelalters und zu Beginn der Neuzeit* (Berlin, 1915).

15. Aegidius of Rome was strongly influenced by Thomas Aquinas and through him by Aristotle. Aegidius and his school therefore cannot be considered as representatives of a pure Augustinianism. On the influence of Augustine on the Franciscan school and on Aquinas, see above, note 9. Only in the eighteenth century did there develop in the Augustinian order a theology of purely Augustinian inspiration, see Portalié's article, "Augustinianisme," *Dict. de théol. cath.*, I, 2485-2501.

16. The Augustinian Bartholomew of Urbino composed before the middle of the fourteenth century his *Milleloquium veritatis Augustini*, containing testimonies on Augustine as well as abstracts from his works arranged by subjects (R. Sabbadini, *Le scoperte dei codici latini e greci ne' secoli XIV e XV*, II [Florence, 1914], 163 f.). On the Lives of St. Augustine composed by various Augustinian Hermits, see G. Sanderlin, "John Capgrave speaks up for the Hermits," *Speculum*, XVIII (1943), 358-62.

17. K. Werner, *op. cit.*; M. Heitzman, "Etudes sur l'Académie Platonicienne de Florence," *Bulletin international de l'Académie Polonaise de sciences et lettres, Classe de philologie, classe d'histoire et de philosophie* (1932), 18 ff.; (1933), 35 ff.

Canons and Augustinian Hermits vied with each other in the veneration of their common patron and even engaged in a literary controversy on the question whether Augustine had been a monk.[18] The Augustinian orders were also active in reviving the cult of Augustine's mother Monica.[19] Moreover, the works of Augustine held an important place in the libraries of the Renaissance. They are found in many manuscripts of the late fourteenth and fifteenth century,[20] and in many printed editions of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century.[21] A great number of these manuscripts and editions clearly reflect a primarily religious or theological interest in the works of the great Church Father.[22] This religious interest in Augustine was further emphasized by such new mystical movements as the *Devotio Moderna,* which originated in the Netherlands toward the end of the fourteenth century and spread its influence to France and Germany during the fifteenth century. For the followers of

18. On this controversy see *Acta Sanctorum,* August VI (1868), 248 ff. The controversy was stopped by a bull of Sixtus IV, dated May 1484. However, two tracts by the Augustinian Canon Eusebius Corradus which belong to the same controversy were published twice in the same year, 1484 (GKW, nos. 2864 and 2923). Ambrosius Massarius, General of the Augustinian Hermits, composed a commentary on the Rule of Augustine in form of a dialogue between the author and Augustine (GKW, 2937). Many early editions of Augustine were due to the active interest of Augustinian Canons (GKW, 2864, 2867, 2917, 2923) or of Augustinian Hermits (GKW, 2915 and 2937).

19. The relics of St. Monica were brought from Ostia to Rome under Martin V, upon the request of the Augustinian order. See *Acta Sanctorum,* May I (1866), 493 ff.; L. Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste,* I (Freiburg, 1886), 178 f. The church of S. Spirito in Florence, which belonged to the Augustinian Hermits, contains a canvas representing St. Monica with a group of women companions, painted in the second half of the fifteenth century (1483) and attributed to Francesco Botticini. For Maffeo Vegio's Life of St. Monica, see below.

20. For manuscripts of Augustine belonging to typical libraries of the fifteenth century, see C. Stornaiolo, *Codices Urbinates Latini,* I (Rome, 1902); A. M. Bandini, *Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae* (Florence, 1774-78).

21. For editions of the fifteenth century, see *Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke* (GKW) III (Leipzig, 1928), col. 67-180. For editions of the early sixteenth century, see G. W. Panzer, *Annales Typographici,* VI-XI (Nürnberg, 1798-1803), and the *Catalogue général des livres imprimés de la Bibliothèque Nationale,* V (Paris, 1900), col. 379 ff.

22. Among the authentic works of Augustine, those of a strictly religious or theological character continued to be copied and published quite often, whereas almost all the apocryphal works published under Augustine's name are of a religious character. It is interesting to note that of the 187 editions listed in the GKW under Augustine's name, 116 contain apocryphal works.

this movement, Augustine was, after the Bible, the leading authority,[23] and this fact becomes the more significant because of the importance the movement assumed in the fields of education and scholarship.

All these were certainly important aspects of Augustinian influence during the Renaissance, which deserve a more detailed study. It is also known that the teachings of Augustine assumed a new significance in the theological discussions of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, which may very well be considered as a part of the Renaissance. However, I should like to emphasize in this paper the influence of Augustine upon two movements that were perhaps the most characteristic new currents of the early Renaissance, that is, Humanism and Platonism, and to show that these movements were accompanied by a significantly new approach to Augustine, which was literary and philosophical rather than religious or theological.

The classical orientation of the Renaissance which we call humanism begins with Petrarch, and it is precisely Petrarch of all the humanists for whom Augustine had special importance.[24] Petrarch's letters are full of quotations and praises of Augustine, and we learn not only that Augustine was one of his favorite authors, but also that Augustine had a de-

23. The works and ideas of Gerard Groote, the founder of the movement, show the powerful influence of Augustine (A. Hyma, *The Christian Renaissance: A History of the Devotio Moderna* [New York, 1924], p. 19). Augustine is quoted by Groote more often than any other author (*ibid.*, p. 433), and the decisive chapter 31 of the Statutes of the Brethren of the Common Life, entitled *De vita communi et paupertate*, begins with a quotation from Augustine (*ibid.*, p. 467). Augustine and Bernard were also the favorite authors of other representatives of the movement, such as Wessel Gansfort (*ibid.*, pp. 207, 214), John Standonck (*ibid.*, p. 238), and others. See also A. Renaudet, *Préréforme et humanisme à Paris pendant les premières guerres d'Italie* (Paris, 1916), pp. 254 ff.

24. The basic material for Petrarch's attitude toward Augustine has been collected by P. De Nolhac, *Pétrarque et l'humanisme* (2nd ed., Paris, 1907), II, pp. 189 ff. The best analysis of Augustine's influence on Petrarch, which penetrates through the merely cultural facts right to the core of Petrarch's moral and religious feelings, has been given by P. P. Gerosa, "L'Umanesimo agostiniano del Petrarca," *Didaskaleion*, N.S., anno III (1925), fasc. 2, 63-113; fasc. 3, 13-29; anno IV (1926), fasc. 1, 107-37; anno V (1927), fasc. 1, 69-127; anno VII (1929), fasc. 1, 125-48. See also: C. Segré, "Il 'Secretum' del Petrarca e le 'Confessioni' di Sant' Agostino," in his *Studi Petrarcheschi* (Florence, 1903), pp. 3-136; C. Calcaterra, "S. Agostino nelle opere di Dante e del Petrarca," in *S. Agostino (Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, Supplement to vol. XXIII [1931]; 422-99. The section on Petrarch, which begins on p. 448, seems to lean heavily on Gerosa without reaching the latter's penetration); E. Razzoli, *Agostinismo e religiosità del Petrarca* (Milan, 1937); J. H. Whitfield, *Petrarch and the Renascence* (Oxford, 1943).

cisive influence upon his spiritual development.[25] Indeed, Petrarch's religious tracts show some connection with the popular religious literature of the Middle Ages. However, his intimate need for a personal form of Christian religion was best satisfied by the works of Augustine himself, especially by the *Confessions,* which give immediate expression to the personal experience of his conversion and of his religious struggle. Besides the statements found in Petrarch's letters, there are two very significant proofs for the importance he attached to the work of Augustine. Petrarch's most personal work, the *Secretum,* takes the form of a dialogue between Augustine and the author; and it is Augustine who takes the part of the spiritual guide and represents the Christian wisdom destined to overcome the doubts and weaknesses of the poet.[26] And in the famous letter describing Petrarch's trip to Mont Ventoux, so often quoted as a characteristic document of modern feeling and desire for nature and solitude, the author tells us that, when he arrived at the peak of the mountain and felt overwhelmed by the marvelous view, he took Augustine's *Confessions* out of his pocket and opened it at random. The passage which he read, and which he paraphrases in his own words, is significant enough: "Men go to admire the heights of mountains, the great floods of the sea, the shores of the ocean, and the orbits of the stars, and neglect themselves." Nothing is admirable but the soul: this is Petrarch's conclusion.[27] Very similar are the words spoken by Augustine in the *Secretum*: "What does it help to know many things, if you have known the whole of earth and of heaven, the vastness of the sea and the circles of the stars, the forces of plants and stones, and the secrets of nature, if you remain unknown to yourselves?"[28] The return from nature

25. De Nolhac, *op. cit.,* pp. 191 f.

26. *Francisci Petrarchae Opera* (Basel, 1581), pp. 331-69.

27. " 'Et eunt homines admirari alta montium et ingentes fluctus maris et latissimos lapsus fluminum et oceani ambitum et giros siderum, et relinquunt seipsos.' Obstupui, fateor . . . librum clausi, iratus michimet quod nunc etiam terrestria mirarer, qui iampridem ab ipsis gentium philosophis discere debuissem nichil preter animum esse mirabile, cui magno nichil est magnum" (Francesco Petrarca, *Le Familiari,* ed. V. Rossi, Vol. I [Florence, 1933], p. 159; cf. *Confessions* X, 8). For Petrarch's copy of the *Confessions,* see De Nolhac, op. cit., pp. 193 ff.

28. "Quamquam vel multa nosse quid revelat, si cum coeli terraeque ambitum, si cum maris spatium et astrorum cursus herbarumque virtutes ac lapidum et naturae secreta didiceritis vobis estis incogniti . . ." (*Opera, op. cit.,* p. 340; cf. G. Gentile, "Il carattere della filosofia del Petrarca," *Nuova Antologia* [Luglio-Agosto, 1934], p. 496).

to man, which is so characteristic of Petrarch, and the whole emphasis on man which became so important throughout the Renaissance, is here, in its origin, connected with the name and doctrine of Augustine.

Petrarch's personal form of religion had no direct influence upon his followers among the humanists, and his emphasis on man, although accepted and developed by many of them, did not retain its original connection with Augustine. Only Maffeo Vegio seems to have shared Petrarch's personal attachment to Augustine, and his *Life of Saint Monica* must be considered as the indirect homage of a Christian humanist to the memory of the great Church Father.[29] Yet there is still another less profound and less personal aspect in Petrarch's approach to Augustine, which was destined to exercise a much wider influence. Petrarch's humanism derives its historical importance not so much from any specific ideas it contributed to the traditional body of occidental thought and science, but rather from a sort of cultural reorientation which it intended to accomplish. Petrarch rejected the medieval form of learning which is commonly called scholasticism, and attempted to replace it with the rediscovered literature of classical antiquity, which he tried to establish as a new and exclusive intellectual standard. However, this rejection of scholasticism was not meant to be a rejection of Christianity. On the contrary, Petrarch was a sincere Christian who wanted to reconcile his classical culture with his Christian religion. Consequently, in rejecting the medieval theologians, he was driven to attach still greater importance to the prescholastic theologians, that is, to the Church Fathers, and especially to Augustine. Moreover, Petrarch was aware of the fact that Augustine lived before the end of the Roman empire and civilization. Hence Augustine is considered as a part of the rediscovered ancient literature itself; his works are collected in Petrarch's library by the side of those of the Latin poets, historians, orators, and philosophers; he becomes, along with the other Fathers of the Church, a Christian classic; and the study of their works ceases to be only theology in the traditional sense, and becomes the study of sacred literature.[30]

This literary attitude of Petrarch toward Augustine determined that

29. G. Voigt, *Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums*, 3rd ed., II (Berlin, 1893), 41.

30. De Nolhac, *op. cit.*, pp. 189 ff. This point is also well recognized by Gerosa who calls Petrarch a "restauratore degli studi patristici, particolarmente degli studi agostiniani" (*op. cit.*, anno VII [1929], p. 148).

of most other humanists, and it manifested itself in several ways. Above all, the humanists observed that Augustine and the other Fathers were themselves imbued with classical learning. Hence, when the humanists had to defend their own work against the attacks of contemporary theologians, they liked to quote the Fathers both as examples and supporters of their own intellectual ideal, and they came at last to consider the Fathers as their own precursors. Quotations of this type are frequent from Petrarch to Beroaldus and Erasmus.[31] When Salutati wanted to defend his ideal of "poetry," the authority of the Fathers was one of his most effective arguments.[32] For the same reason, Leonardo Bruni's version of the letter in which St. Basil recommends the reading of the pagan classical writers became one of the most popular instruments in the diffusion of the humanistic movement, as the enormous number of its manuscript copies would seem to prove.[33] Especially significant is a letter of Erasmus in which he points out that Augustine and the other Fathers were themselves *Grammatici* and lived in a period when Aristotle had not yet been introduced into the schools of the theologians.[34]

Moreover, the humanists were ready to recognize and appreciate the Church Fathers as ancient writers. Their works are quoted, along with those of the other classical writers, on questions of grammar and rhetoric and taken as testimonies of ancient usage and theory. Lorenzo Valla, in his *Dialectica,* still considers Augustine as a classical author of the good

31. For Petrarch, see De Nolhac, *op. cit.,* pp. 192 f.; Whitfield, *op. cit.,* pp. 38 f. For Beroaldus, see Renaudet, *op. cit.,* p. 116. For Erasmus, see P. Mestwerdt, *Die Anfänge des Erasmus* (Leipzig, 1917), p. 211; W. H. Woodward, *Desiderius Erasmus concerning the aim and method of education* (Cambridge, 1904), pp. 48 f. See also: W. H. Woodward, *Vittorino da Feltre and other Humanist Educators* (Cambridge, 1921), p. 149 (Enea Silvio); 213; 226 f.

32. *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati,* ed. F. Novati, IV, pp. 224 f.; cf. III, pp. 290, 542. Cf. A. von Martin, *Mittelalterliche Welt- und Lebensanschauung im Spiegel der Schriften Coluccio Salutatis* (Munich, 1913), pp. 134, 150; Whitfield, *op. cit.,* p. 98.

33. On Bruni's translation of Basil and its popularity, see H. Baron, *Leonardo Bruni Aretino: Humanistisch-philosophische Schriften* (Leipzig, 1928), pp. 160 f.; L. Bertalot, "Forschungen über Leonardo Bruni Aretino," *Archivum Romanicum,* XV (1931), 302; Woodward, *Desiderius Erasmus,* pp. 48 f. I have seen dozens of manuscripts of this translation.

34. "Neque negari potest Hieronymum Ambrosium Augustinum quorum auctoritate potissimum res theologica nititur ex hoc grammaticorum ordine fuisse, quandoquidem id temporis nec Aristoteles etiamnum in theologorum scholas erat receptus et haec philosophia qua nunc in scholis utuntur nondum erat nata" (letter to Henricus Bovillus, dated August 31, 1513, printed in *Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami Opera Omnia* III [Leiden, 1703], col. 128 D; I have been unable to verify this letter in Allen's *Opus Epistolarum*).

period; it is only after Boethius that the decay of the Latin language and literature is thought to have begun.[35] Hence the works of the Fathers are accepted as part of the curriculum of the humanistic school. When humanists like Bruni, Guarino, Lefèvre d'Etaples, and Erasmus try to establish a reading program, Augustine and the other Fathers receive their due place in it.[36] When Vives briefly lists the Latin writers worth reading, he includes Augustine and Lactantius among the other ancients and passes from them directly to Petrarch and the other humanists.[37] Thus Augustine and the other Fathers were no less read in the humanistic period than they had been in the preceding age, but they were grouped with the classical writers rather than with the medieval theologians, and this fact could not fail to bring about a change in the way in which they were read and understood.[38]

Finally, the active interest which the humanists dedicated to the classical authors was also extended to the Church Fathers. Among the Greek texts which the humanists translated into Latin and thus made available to the educated reader in Western Europe, the works of the eastern theologians, that is, Basil, John Chrysostom, Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril, and others, occupy a prominent place. Thus many of these works were translated for the first time, and some of them became very popular.[39] Moreover, the new philological methods of editing and of commenting which

35. In the preface, Valla lists the ancient authors, including the Church Fathers, and concludes with "eruditorum ultimus Boetius" (*Dialectice Laurentii Valle libri tres* [Paris, 1509], f. 1). Also Salutati believes that writers such as Ambrose and Augustine succeeded in carrying the tradition of ancient eloquence down to the time of Theodosius and his successors when Cassiodore lived; only thereafter did the great decay take place (*Epistolario*, III, pp. 82 f.; cf. Whitfield, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 f.).

36. For Bruni, see Baron, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 19. For Guarino, see W. H. Woodward, *Studies in Education during the Age of the Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1924), pp. 43, 46. For Lefèvre, see Renaudet, *op. cit.*, p. 487. For Erasmus, see Woodward, *Desiderius Erasmus*, p. 140; Mestwerdt, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

37. *De conscribendis epistolis*, ch. 4 (Jo. Lud. Vives, *Opera Omnia*, II [Valencia, 1782], 312 f.).

38. For the attitude of the humanists toward the Church Fathers in general and toward Augustine in particular, cf. also Pastor, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 f.; *Epistolario di Coluccio Salutati*, IV, 131 f.

39. This fact will become apparent when we shall have the badly needed bibliography of Latin translations from the Greek. At the present, catalogues of manuscripts and of incunabula are our only source of information for this part of the activity of the humanists. The humanist Giannozzo Manetti also made a new Latin translation of the Psalms and the New Testament (Cod. Vat. Pal. lat. 40-43, and 45; Urb. lat. 5 and 6) which has remained unknown to Erasmus and hence to most modern scholars.

characterize the classical studies of the humanists were also applied to the works of the Latin Fathers, and especially of Augustine.[40] There is a considerable number of humanistic manuscripts of Augustine, and among the early printed editions of Augustine's works there are many which were the fruit of the patient work of humanistic scholars. The *De Civitate Dei* was among the first books printed in Italy.[41] Eusebius Corradus, an Augustinian Canon with humanistic education, apparently attempted critical editions of certain works of Augustine.[42] A later edition containing several philosophical treatises of Augustine was corrected by the same Corradus, in co-operation with Thaddeus Ugoletus, a well-known philologian, and prefaced by Severinus Chalcus, another Augustinian Canon of humanistic background and brother of the Chancelor of the Duke of Milan.[43] In Basel, the humanist Sebastian Brant added a Latin poem of praise to an edition of Augustine's *Sermons*,[44] and the humanist printer John Amerbach, after publishing several separate works of Augustine,[45] issued in 1506 the first comprehensive edition of Augustine's works.[46] In Lyons and Paris the humanist publisher

40. Some of Augustine's works were even "discovered" by the early humanists (Sabbadini, *op. cit.* I, 101 and II, 15). Roberto de'Bardi collected Augustine's *Sermons* (*ibid.*, II, 35); the humanist Pope Nicolaus V, his *Letters* (Pastor, *op. cit.*, pp. 287 f.).

41. (Subiaco, 1467), GKW 2874.

42. *Opuscula* (Venice, 1484), GKW 2864; *Sermones de vita clericorum* (Padua, 1484), GKW 2923.

43. *Opuscula* (Parma, 1491), GKW 2867. The preface speaks of the search made in all Italian libraries (cf. Sabbadini, *op. cit.*, I, 148 f.). This seems to be the *Editio princeps* for such works as *Contra Academicos, De ordine, De immortalitate animae, De quantitate animae, De libero arbitrio, De magistro*, and others. Cf. GKW 2869.

44. GKW 2920.

45. *Liber epistolarum* (1493), GKW 2906; *Explanatio Psalmorum* (1489), GKW 2909; *Expositio Evangelii secundum Johannem* (ca. 1491), GKW 2912; *Sermones* (1494-95), GKW 2920; *De Trinitate* (1489), GKW 2926. In most of these editions the publisher emphasizes the careful emendation to which the text has been subjected. Augustine's *De Arte Praedicandi* had been published in Strasbourg (ca. 1466) by an anonymous editor, apparently a Regular Canon, who also stresses the fact in his preface that he has made use of all manuscripts he could find in Heidelberg, Speyer, Worms, and Strasbourg, and thus has established a correct text (GKW 2871).

46. Panzer, *Annales Typographici*, VI, 181, 46. Renaudet (*op. cit.*, p. 257) has published a letter of John Buren to Mombaer, in which the sender refers to an enclosed list of Augustine's works and asks Mombaer to check it in the libraries of Paris, and to have the respective texts copied and sent to Basel "ad fratrem Augustinum Frisonem Can. Reg. apud S. Leonardum . . . quos cum habuerit faciet Basileae omnia opera Augustini imprimi quae iam pro magna parte absoluta sunt." It would thus appear that the Augustinian Canons had something to do with the Amerbach edition. The edition was reprinted in Paris, 1515 (Panzer VIII, 26, 822).

Jodocus Badius Ascensius edited several collections of Augustine's treatises.[47]

But the most important contributions were made by Erasmus and Vives. Vives published (Basel, 1522) a critical edition of the *De Civitate Dei* with a philological commentary.[48] In his dedicatory letter to King Henry VIII, Vives praises "this worke . . . wherein Saint Augustine hath collected as in a treasury the best part of those readings which hee had selected in the ancient authors." Augustine thus succeeded in preserving valuable remnants of ancient literature, and "some great men of this later age have bin much holpen by these writings of Augustine for Varro, Sallust, Livy and Tulli *De Republica*. . . ." In the letter in which the King thanks Vives for having dedicated this work to him, the King refers to "Saint Augustine who long time imperfect and obscure is now at last brought from darkenesse to light and restored to his ancient integrity."[49] Thus, as the whole humanistic movement had claimed to achieve a revival of ancient literature and civilization, Vives is here credited with having "revived" the work of Augustine. It is significant that Vives, who is somewhat critical of Augustine's style, would include only the *De Civitate Dei* in his reading program,[50] and that just this work, in Vives' edition, was apparently the only writing of Augustine known to

47. *Opus Quaestionum* (Lyons, 1497), GKW 2915; P. Renouard, *Bibliographie des impressions et des oeuvres de Josse Badius Ascensius*, II (Paris, 1908), pp. 53 ff.; from the preface to Petrus Gerardus, Prior of the Convent of the Augustinian Hermits in Paris, it appears that most of the texts were taken from the library of that monastery, and had been originally collected by Friar Augustine of Ratisbonne, bachelor of theology, whereas Badius himself had emended the text, added many variants, and verified the Scriptural quotations. *Opuscula* (Paris, 1502) (Renouard, pp. 56 ff.); Badius claims to have improved the text of the earlier editions, and to have added four works; this edition was reprinted in 1513 and 1520 (Renouard, pp. 59 f.). *Liber Epistolarum* (Paris, 1515) (Renouard, pp. 60 f.); reprinted 1517 (*ibid.*, pp. 61 f.). *Sermones* (Paris, 1516) (*ibid.*, pp. 62 f.).

48. This edition was reprinted very often, first as volume five of Erasmus' edition of Augustine's works, and also translated into French and English. See A. Bonilla y San Martin, *Luis Vives y la filosofia del renacimiento* (Madrid, 1903), pp. 752 ff. In several letters to Erasmus, Vives reports about his work on this edition and commentary (*Opera Omnia*, VII [Valencia, 1788], 158, 163, 171, 176).

49. St. Augustine, *Of the citie of God, with the learned comments of Jo. Lod. Vives. Englished by J. H.* [John Healey], (London, 1610).

50. "Augustinus multum habet Africitatis in contextu dictionis, non perinde in verbis, praesertim in libris *De civitate Dei* quod unum ex eius operibus legendum censeo philologo, id enim bona ex parte in media philologia versatur" (*De tradendis disciplinis*, III, 8, in *Opera Omnia*, VI [Valencia, 1785], p. 340).

Montaigne.[51] Finally, Erasmus published, in 1528-29, a critical edition of Augustine's works,[52] which constitutes an essential part of his great editing activity dedicated to the text of the Bible and the Fathers, and which remained the standard edition of Augustine for many decades, until it was replaced first by the text of the Louvain theologians,[53] and finally by that of the Benedictines of St. Maur.[54]

Erasmus thus did more than any other humanist for the text of Augustine. Yet his personal attitude toward Augustine is somewhat ambiguous and by no means comparable to Petrarch's worship of the great Church Father. It is true, besides editing Augustine's works, Erasmus often quotes and praises him and recommends his study. There is no doubt that, in his youth, Erasmus had been deeply influenced by Augustine, a fact that can be easily explained by his connection with the *Devotio Moderna.* However, in his later years Erasmus openly criticizes Augustine's deficiencies and his errors in the interpretation of the Bible, and clearly prefers St. Jerome, because of the latter's humanistic attitude and greater philological learning.[55] It is interesting to note that this comparative lack of enthusiasm for Augustine on Erasmus' part was criticized by Martin Luther,[56] as well as by his Catholic opponent, Dr. John Eck.[57]

No less significant is the influence of Augustine upon the second great movement of the early Renaissance, that is, Platonism. The Augustinian

51. *Essais,* I, 21 (ed. P. Villey, I, 188); P. Villey, *Les sources et l'évolution des Essais de Montaigne,* I (Paris, 1908), 72 f., 237 f.; Abercrombie, *op. cit.,* pp. 40-56 ("Montaigne and the City of God"). See also R. G. Remsberg, *Wisdom and Science at Port Royal and the Oratory* (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1940), pp. 39-45.

52. Panzer, VI, 267, 721.

53. Antwerp, 1576-77 *(Bibliothèque Nationale).*

54. Paris, 1679-1700 *(ibid.).*

55. Mestwerdt, *op. cit.,* pp. 224 f., 240 f., 264. The main source is Erasmus' letter to Dr. John Eck, May 15, 1518 (*Opus Epistolarum Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami,* ed. P. S. Allen, III, no. 844, pp. 330 ff.). See also his *Hieronymi Stridonensis Vita* (*Erasmi Opuscula,* ed. W. K. Ferguson [The Hague, 1933], pp. 180 f.).

56. In a letter to Spalatin (1516), Luther says Erasmus should read more of Augustine, then he would arrive at a more favorable opinion of Augustine than he has held so far. "Ego sane in hoc dissentire ab Erasmo non dubito quod Augustino in Scripturis interpretandis tantum posthabeo Hieronymum quantum ipse Augustinum in omnibus Hieronymo posthabet" (quoted by A. Hamel, *Der junge Luther und Augustin,* I [Gütersloh, 1934], 6 f.).

57. See Eck's letter to Erasmus, dated Feb. 2, 1518 (*Opus Epistolarum,* III [Oxford, 1913], no. 769, pp. 209 ff.). Eck also admonishes Erasmus to read Augustine, since he does not seem to know him sufficiently.

current of the later Middle Ages was certainly one of the major roots or antecedents of Renaissance Platonism.[58] When Petrarch considered Plato to be superior to Aristotle, and thus protested against the scholastic worship of Aristotle, he did not base his opinion on a direct knowledge of Plato's works, so much as on the testimony of Cicero and Augustine.[59] When Bessarion tries to Christianize the Platonism of his master Pletho and to defend Plato against the charges of the Byzantine Aristotelians, he quotes Augustine quite frequently in praise of Plato and the Platonists,[60] and also refers to his authority on many questions of dogmatic theology[61]; but we fail to notice any significant influence of Augustine upon Bessarion's philosophical ideas, and this fact may well be explained by the latter's Byzantine background.[62] Yet his contemporary, Cusanus, was familiar with Augustine through his connection both with the *Devotio Moderna* and with Italian humanism; and his interest in Platonism as well as many of his metaphysical doctrines show the influence of Augustine.[63] Even the term *Docta Ignorantia,* which is the title of his main work and which is intended to describe his characteristic method of speculation, was taken from a letter of Augustine, as Cusanus himself was well aware.[64]

Yet the influence of Augustine attained its full significance only when Renaissance Platonism reached its culminating point in Marsilio Ficino, the great translator and commentator of Plato and Plotinus, and leader of the Platonic Academy in Florence.[65] Ficino asserts in one of his letters that his interest in the Platonic philosophy was first awakened by the

58. Cf. Heitzman, *op. cit.*

59. "A maioribus Plato, Aristotiles laudatur a pluribus" (Petrarca, *Le traité De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia,* ed. L. M. Capelli [Paris, 1906], pp. 72 f.).

60. L. Mohler, *Kardinal Bessarion als Theologe, Humanist und Staatsmann* (Paderborn, 1923), p. 389; *Bessarionis in Calumniatorem Platonis libri IV,* ed. L. Mohler (Paderborn, 1927), pp. 24, 26, etc.

61. *Ibid.,* pp. 242, 284, etc.

62. Some of Augustine's works had been translated into Greek before the fifteenth century, especially the *De Trinitate, De vera religione,* and *De libero arbitrio.* See M. Rackl, "Die griechischen Augustinusübersetzungen," *Miscellanea Ehrle,* 1 (Rome, 1924), 1-38.

63. E. Vansteenberghe, *Le cardinal Nicolas de Cues* (Paris, 1920), pp. 409 ff.

64. Nicolaus Cusanus, *Apologia doctae ignorantiae,* ed. R. Klibansky (Leipzig, 1932), p. 13.

65. I have been unable to see an article of E. Garin, "S. Agostino e Marsilio Ficino," *Bollettino storico agostiniano* (1940). I am indebted for this reference to Professor G. Prezzolini.

Latin Platonists,[66] and in another letter, in which he lists the Latin sources of Platonism, he mentions among others Augustine.[67] The special importance of Augustine for Ficino's work is explicitly emphasized in another letter with which Ficino apparently sent to the Archbishop Giovanni Niccolini a copy of his major philosophical work, the *Theologia Platonica.* After quoting Augustine's judgment about the Platonists, Ficino continues as follows: "Being first induced by the authority of the divine Augustine and then confirmed by the judgment of many Christian saints, I thought it would be worth while to philosophize in the Academy since I had to philosophize anyway."[68] Similarly, in the preface to the *Theologia Platonica,* Ficino again quotes Augustine as saying that Plato is very close to the Christian truth, and continues: "For a long time I have believed in the authority of Augustine . . . and decided to produce an image of Plato most similar to the Christian truth . . ."[69] That is, Augustine's authority not only determined Ficino's orientation toward Plato, but Augustine also served him as a model in his attempt to create a system of Christian Platonism.

These words are fully confirmed by an analysis of Ficino's works, especially of the *Theologia Platonica.* Augustine is not only mentioned quite frequently, but there occur a number of lengthy quotations from his works which touch upon important philosophical questions. The selection of the works quoted by Ficino is also significant: *Confessions, De Civitate Dei, Enchiridion, Contra Academicos, Quaestiones, Soliloquia, De Immortalitate Animae, De Quantitate Animae, De Musica, De Vera*

66. Marsilius Ficinus, *Opera Omnia* (Basel, 1576), p. 929.

67. *Op. cit.,* p. 899; R. Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages* (London, 1939), p. 46.

68. ". . . affirmat denique (that is, Augustinus) Platonicos mutatis paucis Christianos absque controversia fore seque illos ex omnium philosophorum numero iccirco potissimum elegisse. . . . Ego igitur divi Augustini primum auctoritate adductus, deinde multorum apud Christianos sanctorum hominum testimonio confirmatus operae pretium fore censui quandoquidem mihi philosophandum esset ut in Achademia precipue philosopharer . . ." (*Op. Om.,* p. 855).

69. ". . . praesertim cum Plato de his ita sentiat ut Aurelius Augustinus eum tanquam Christianae veritati omnium proximum ex omni philosophorum numero elegerit imitandum asserueritque Platonicos mutatis paucis Christianos fore. Ego vero cum iampridem Aureliana auctoritate fretus summaque in genus humanum charitate adductus Platonis ipsius simulacrum quoddam Christianae veritati simillimum exprimere statuissem . . ." (*Ibid.,* p. 78).

Religione, De Libero Arbitrio, De Trinitate,[70] that is, the most popular works of Augustine, along with his early philosophical writings.

Moreover, among Ficino's works there are a few short compositions which in their style and inspiration are clearly dependent upon Augustine, such as the *Dialogus inter Deum et Animam theologicus,* and the *Oratio ad Deum theologica.*[71] Ficino's indebtedness to Augustine appears also in many important doctrines, such as the ubiquity of the soul in the body,[72] the active character of sense perception,[73] and the conception of God as the master of the human mind.[74] Ficino's theory of the formulae inherent in the human mind and dependent on the ideas of the divine mind, as well as his definition of knowledge as a formation of the mind by God, are developments of Augustine's theory of illumination.[75] When Ficino conceives the desire for God as a natural appetite of the soul and compares it to the natural movement of the elements toward their proper place, he obviously bases his thought on a remarkable passage of the *Confessions,* in which our love for God is defined as a kind of weight.[76] The parallelism of intellect and will and the insistence on the superiority of will and love over intellect and knowledge, which is characteristic of Ficino's thought, especially during the later stages of its development, goes back to Augustine.[77] Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana* also contains the seeds of what Ficino would call Platonic love, that is, the personal relation between two human beings based upon the intimate relation of each individual to God.[78] When Ficino talks of the restlessness of the human soul and insists that the mind is determined by an infinite desire for truth and goodness which finds its satisfaction only in God, ultimate source and origin of all truth and goodness,[79] we are re-

70. *Ibid.,* pp. 730 f., etc.; 758, etc.; 130; 769; 1223; 258; 263 f., etc.; 998; 822; 758; 277; 308 f., etc.

71. *Ibid.,* pp. 609, 665.

72. *Ibid.,* pp. 177 f.; cf. Augustine, *De quantitate animae,* chs. 31 and 32, and *De immortalitate animae,* ch. 16.

73. *Ibid.,* p. 178, cf. Augustine, *De musica* VI, 5.

74. *Ibid.,* p. 267; cf. Augustine, *De magistro.*

75. P. O. Kristeller, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino* (New York, 1943), pp. 236 ff., 248 f.

76. *Ibid.,* pp. 189 ff. Cf. *Confessions,* XIII, 9: "Pondus meum amor meus."

77. *Ibid.,* pp. 272 ff.

78. *Ibid.,* pp. 279 ff. Cf. *De doctrina christiana,* I, 22 f.

79. *Ibid.,* pp. 56 ff., 271.

minded of the opening chapters of the *Confessions* which culminate in the sentence: "My heart is restless until it rests in Thee."[80] Finally, when it becomes apparent that Ficino's entire metaphysics is centered on the concepts of God and the soul, and when, in the preface to the *Theologia Platonica,* he announces his intention of interpreting the philosophy of Plato in terms of God and the soul,[81] we remember immediately the opening questions of Augustine's *Soliloquia* which lead to the answer: "I seek God and the soul."[82]

These quotations and coincidences are not merely incidental. They show some of the basic ideas of Augustine have been absorbed in some of the central doctrines of Ficino's Platonism, who must be called, after Petrarch, one of the greatest Augustinians of the Renaissance. There are, however, also a few remarkable differences which should not be overlooked. In Ficino, the elements derived from Augustine are fused with many other ideas that have a quite different origin. On the other hand, many central doctrines of Augustine, such as those of faith, sin, grace, and predestination, though by no means abandoned in Ficino, receive much less emphasis than in the works of the Church Father. Obviously it is not so much Augustine's definite theological position, but rather the philosophical and Neoplatonic element of his thought which has been accepted and revived in Ficino's Platonism.

After Ficino, Renaissance Platonism continues to show the traces of Augustine's influence, but to a somewhat lesser degree. Pico has many works of Augustine in his library and quotes him especially in his polemic against astrology, but he does not use him in his *Conclusiones,* and does not seem to be indebted to him for any of his major ideas.[83] John Colet apparently was much devoted to Augustine, although Erasmus seems to assert the contrary.[84] Lorenzo de' Medici composed a poetical paraphrase of Ficino's *Oratio* in the last chapter of his *Altercazione,*[85] and similarly we may suppose that it was Ficino who, through his works, transmitted many Augustinian elements to the later philosophers, theo-

80. *Confessions,* I, 1: "Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te."

81. *The Philosophy,* p. 204.

82. *Soliloquia,* I, 2: "Deum et animam scire cupio."

83. For Pico's library, see Pearl Kibre, *The Library of Pico della Mirandola* (New York, 1936). For his philosophy, see E. Garin, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola* (Florence, 1937).

84. J. H. Lupton, *A Life of John Colet* (London, 1887), p. 357.

85. Cf. *Giornale Critico della filosofia italiana,* XIX (1938), 151.

logians, and poets influenced by his Platonism. When Francesco Patrizzi, toward the end of the sixteenth century, attempts once more to revive Neoplatonism, he refers again explicitly to the judgment of Augustine and of the other Church Fathers.[86]

The other philosophical movements of the Renaissance which came after Platonism showed, on the whole, no basic affinity with the work of Augustine, although traces of his influence may be found everywhere, especially in Campanella,[87] and among the Stoics of the later Renaissance.[88] Much more significant, however, was the theological influence which Augustine exercised on the Protestant Reformers[89] as well as on many of their Catholic opponents.[90] A new phase of Augustinian influence was manifested in seventeenth-century France. Different theological schools, such as the Jansenists and the Oratorians, were equally inspired by Augustine,[91] whereas his philosophical influence becomes apparent in such thinkers as Descartes, Pascal, and especially Malebranche.[92] These developments are of the greatest significance for the

86. "Platonicos hosce philosophos D. Augustinus theologorum columen et culmen philosophorum omnium nobilissimos semper in ore habet et cacteris omnibus anteponit. Et tantus theologiae pater coenobitarum animos non movet?" (Franciscus Patritius, *Nova de universis philosophia* [Ferrara, 1591], preface addressed to Pope Gregory XIV). Cf. B. Brickman, *An Introduction to Francesco Patrizi's Nova de Universis Philosophia* (New York, 1941).

87. L. Blanchet, *Les antecédents historiques du "Je pense, donc je suis"* (Paris, 1920), pp. 169 ff.

88. N. Abercrombie, *Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought* (Oxford, 1938), p. 6.

89. F. Held, *Augustins Enarrationes in Psalmos als exegetische Vorlage für Luthers erste Psalmenvorlesung* (thesis, Kiel, 1929); A. Hamel, *Der junge Luther und Augustin*, 2 vols. (Gütersloh, 1934-35); see above, note 56.

90. See the excellent article of H. Jedin, "Agostino Moreschini und seine Apologie Augustins," in *Aurelius Augustinus: Festschrift der Goerresgesellschaft* (Cologne, 1930), pp. 137-53. Characteristic are also the following titles: *Collectanea ex universo opere librorum D. Aurelii Augustini passim decerpta semitam quandam mediam Christianis nunc misere dissentienbus* (sic) *monstrantia qua unanimiter ad ecclesiam Christi redeant* (Deventer, 1529) (W. Nijhoff and M. E. Kronenberg, *Nederlandsche Bibliographie van 1500 tot 1540* [Hague, 1923], No. 148); Eustachius de Rosario O.P., *Sanctus Augustinus Romano-Catholicae fidei confessor ac defensor* (Augsburg, 1676) (copy owned by Mr. and Mrs. William Salloch, New York City).

91. R. G. Remsberg, *Wisdom and Science at Port-Royal and the Oratory: A Study of Contrasting Augustinianisms* (Yellow Springs, Ohio, 1940); N. Abercrombie, *The Origins of Jansenism* (Oxford, 1936).

92. Blanchet, *op. cit.*; N. Abercrombie, *Saint Augustine and French Classical Thought* (Oxford, 1938); E. Gilson, *Études sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système cartésien* (Paris, 1930), pp. 32 ff., 191 ff., 259 ff.

history of Augustinianism, as well as for intellectual history in general, but they go beyond the limits of our present study.

Augustine's fortune during the Renaissance is thus determined by the fact that his name and work is closely associated with the origin of two major intellectual movements of the early Renaissance, humanism and Platonism, represented by Petrarch and Ficino respectively. The Renaissance actually discovered or re-emphasized two aspects in Augustine which had been forgotten or, at least, less emphasized during the later Middle Ages: the Christian classic, and the Christian follower of Platonism. A student primarily interested in theology will certainly stress the fact that these two aspects do not constitute the center of Augustine's thought and doctrine, and hence conclude that the Augustinianism of the Renaissance was something superficial and unimportant. He would do well, however, to remember that it was by virtue of this "superficial" Augustinianism that the two leading currents of the early Renaissance, the one literary, and the other philosophical, were kept within the boundaries of the Christian tradition.

FAITH AND REASON: THE IMPLICATIONS OF DR. FERRÉ'S VIEW

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I

PROFESSOR FERRÉ'S ARTICLE, "Faith and Reason," (*Christendom*, Spring, 1943), is an exemplary disclosure of a curious fact which seems to me to underlie the perennial discussion of Faith and Reason. On the surface, one might suppose that two methods of discovering the nature of reality were being impartially discussed. But a closer study reveals that the disputants are avowing specific views of reality which they take for granted as they parade their arguments for faith or reason. Instead of the dispassionate analysis of the operations of faith and reasoning in the knowledge-process, one invariably finds that the functions of reason and faith are determined by the particular view of reality to be espoused. The proponents of Faith have, for example, invariably pointed to a realm of being which they were confident was real, whether or not it was accessible to "reason." And they have insisted that without faith in this order of being, men would never be inspired to moral improvement. We are not asked, therefore, to believe in a certain view of faith, but to accept a certain view of reality.

It is now obvious that there are hidden logical, psychological, and ontological premises behind this discussion, and as we review Professor Ferré's paper we shall bring out those which seem to pervade his thinking. Several considerations of a general nature may, however, be suggested immediately. If the nature of reality is already known, does not the debate over the sphere of faith and reason become a superfluous, if interesting side-issue? In any case, how can the analysis of faith and reason as instruments for investigation reveal *anything* about *any* reality independent of the knower? Would it not seem that faith and reason, whether they be used as methods or as criteria of knowledge, can have no legitimate part in determining the *content* of knowledge?

II

THE SPHERES OF FAITH AND REASON

Dr. Ferré's very definition of faith presupposes a realm in relation to which the import of faith is defined. Faith is the conviction "that there

is a better order in which these [sorrows and troubles] can be overcome" (p. 218). It is "a living affirmation by a self struggling with sin, that the ideal which it sees is ultimately *more real* than its own attitude and condition" (p. 218). Again, it is a positive decision concerning the reality and realizability of the ideal. Repeatedly Dr. Ferré emphasizes the "living affirmation," the dynamic, personal, and "positive decision" of faith that there is an objective order of ideals which "has a reality eminently prior to actuality itself with the power ideally to transform it." It is clear that the significant thing about faith is not so much the attitude of mind and will, important as that is, but the nature and the reality of the ideals envisioned. Faith gets its specific meaning in this discussion not from the epistemological process involved in having faith, but from the object in which the individual has faith.

And the same is true of reason. As a matter of fact, as frequently happens in this controversy, the meaning a thinker ascribes to one term seems to be determined by the meaning and scope given to the other. Indeed, Dr. Ferré's most illuminating statements come when he depicts the complementary functions of faith and reason. We can best understand Dr. Ferré's assertions about faith if we study the limited returns he expects from reason.

Reason is confined to actuality, which, I take it, refers to events and experiences in so far as they have occurred, are occurring, or are predictable as specific historical events. Rational contemplation of ideals sees them only as historically embodied, registers their occurrence, and relates them to other values and occurrences. Reason is restricted to "aggregative" actuality (p. 219). If this is so, it is clear at once that reason cannot, without exceeding its proper domain, assert or deny the existence of any normative realm.

Nowhere in this article, or elsewhere, so far as I know, does Dr. Ferré show why this *must* be so. He does say that reason involves "careful observation, systematization, and appraisal of man's historic experience as a whole" (p. 228), including, of course, ideals already realized. But we get at one reason for his limitations on the scope of reason when he states that "coherence with the actual, correspondence to the actual, or workability within the actual can never be adequate standards for religious faith" (p. 229). Dr. Ferré seems to know already what constitutes religious adequacy. It is clear that he has a prior conviction, drawn from *other* premises, that by reasoning (of any kind, presumably) man can

never find adequate grounds for asserting that there are ideals or values independent of historical actuality and relevant to it. Only Faith has "the vision of the ideal and the affirmation and discovery of spirit that this vision is ultimately true" (p. 228).

Furthermore, as we study these and other statements another fact comes to light. Much as Dr. Ferré insists that reason and faith need each other, there can be no doubt that assertions about reality *as a whole* must be left for Faith to make. Early in his article, as we have noted, Dr. Ferré asserts that by faith we know (a) that the ideal is more real than actual, (b) that the actual can be transformed by the ideal. These assertions imply a prior knowledge that the orders of actuality and of ideality are related in such a way that the actual can be transformed by the ideal. One might suppose on the surface that some other cognitive power, some "common sense" as it were, would have to be postulated to see that these two realms, one open to reason and the other open to faith, are conjunctive. Dr. Ferré, however, assigns the fundamental assertion to Faith, and leaves Reason with the power of check.

III

REASON AS CHECK

Reason's power of check is both practical and theoretical, if I understand Dr. Ferré. Faith does not need help from reason in affirming the "reality" and ultimate efficacy of the ideal. Yet, "without reason faith fails in vision and application" (p. 218). Dr. Ferré thus assigns to reason the prudential function of developing plans of action or instrumental ideals which take into consideration both actuality and the ultimate ideals revealed by faith. However, "Faith is not only the vision of the better that is seen as a desirable mode of operation but is also the effort of aim at value or ideal self-decisions needed to sustain and realize that vision" (p. 220). Man, it would seem, in order to conform actuality to ideality must have faith in the reality of ideals and reason to guide the way from actuality to ideality. Reason cannot deny the "reality" of ideals which faith affirms. It can only see the break between ideals and actuality and be arbiter as to the relevance of these ideals to concrete historical situations.

Still, it must not be supposed that faith gets no theoretical help from empirical reason. The point is that the ideal is "so exceptionally and fragmentarily realized, especially as it approaches its fullness, that only

an act of faith can designate it with assurance as ultimate reality" (pp. 223-24). Dr. Ferré, in other words, thinks that while the case for the objective reality of ideals built on empirical grounds is strong enough to show that atheism is untenable, it is too weak to give "assurance." We do know, he says, on "adequate reasonable" evidence that the highest ideals are not "mere self-creations or haphazard happenings without intrinsic relation to the whole process and the meaning of that process." But, "Faith holds that these ideals show what ultimate reality is better than anything less than they" (p. 227). Reason, it would seem, can disprove the negative but it cannot assure the positive.

As a matter of fact, however, there is an ambivalence in Dr. Ferré's attitude toward the rational. It would seem that he wants the *existence* of independent ideals not to be dependent at any point on reason. We believe in ideals through faith. "Neither formal consistency nor material consistency *per se*, or both together *in loco actualis*, can adequately judge the truth of faith" (p. 225). Rational induction from experienced fact can never "adequately" judge the truth of faith.

However, in the light of this insistence on the autonomy and independence of the grounds for Ideals, such statements as, "The relevance of the ideal for the actual is a rational check on faith" (p. 226), come as a surprise. Plausibility appears only when we realize that the "rational check of faith" is not a check on the reality of the ideals, but only on the practicability of ideals in a given empirical situation. Thus Dr. Ferré says that "faith cannot, nevertheless, claim in the court of reason that the ideal is more real than the actual except to whatever point the transformation has been actually achieved," or is achievable (p. 226). The implication, once more, is that reason can judge the reality of the ideal only in so far as the ideal has permeated the actual. Reason cannot deny reality to an ideal not yet realized and not realizable in probable actuality. The only check on the reality of faith's ideals is within the realm of faith. Faith and reason challenge each other's *relevance*, but not each other's existence or *reality*. In such statements Dr. Ferré seems to equalize the affirmations and status of both faith and reason.

Still, the balance is in fact upset. For faith insists that the ideal is more real than actuality. It goes on to affirm: "The ideal which is most needed to transform the actual would naturally have the highest degree of reality for faith" (p. 226). Curiously enough, then, the *degree of reality* an ideal possesses depends on its relation not to other ultimate

ideals but on its ability to transform the historical world. But if the "reality" of the ideal must be defined in relation to the actual, how can any ideal have *any* meaning and "reality" except in relation to the actual? What goes for the highest or most "real" ideal should apply to the lowest! If we cannot tell the power of an ideal except through its power to transform the actual based on *actual* transformation, how can we tell that we have an ideal to *any* power except by the same process? Such reasoning is consistent with Dr. Ferré's statement that if reason found an ideal of faith completely irrelevant to actuality, and impossible to realize even gradually, it would be no true ideal even for faith (cf. p. 226).

In such statements Dr. Ferré seems to grant reason and actuality, or possible actuality, a check on the very existence of the ideal. The reality of the ideal does seem to depend on its transforming power in actuality. And yet, it also seems clear that Dr. Ferré is concerned more to *bridge* than to remove the logical and metaphysical gap between ideal and actuality. He is not satisfied with irrelevance between the realms, but he is certain that the reality of the ideal cannot be grounded in the actual. He would like to employ reason as a negative check, but the problem of relevance forces him to grant a positive rational check on the very reality of ultimate ideals. But, as we hinted earlier, an underlying distrust of reason to give the assurance he thinks is needed, is the formative motif of this article. The limitation on reason takes root in a specific psychology of motivation.

IV

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF FAITH

We have seen that faith, for Dr. Ferré, "is decidedly not without rational justification" (p. 224). Now, one would suppose that if theism has rational justification on empirical grounds, the philosophical problem is solved, since the truth has been critically approximated. If he has discovered the best hypothesis, all that is left for the reasonable man is action in accordance with it. Faith surely can't make the approximate truth truer!

At this point, however, Dr. Ferré makes a revealing statement which indicates that for him more than rational justification of an hypothesis is necessary. "But to many of us it nevertheless seems true that there is not a sufficient measure of empirical or theoretical knowledge to deal

adequately with the deepest values and meanings of life [*sic!*], especially if we include the central problem of motivation, namely the improvement of our will to affirm, appropriate, and achieve the highest ideal as the most real demanding to be made actual" (p. 224).

The motivation for Dr. Ferré's emphasis on the realm of faith is now clearer still. Life needs faith, says Dr. Ferré, because "reason fails in courage and social concern" (p. 218). As he envisions the human situation, man, in the agony of struggle, with a deep sense of the mystery and tension of life, would find no sufficient basis for courage and sacrifice unless he could affirm the reality of ideals, or "the cosmic resources for world-transformation" (p. 221). Reason without faith makes no "challenge" (p. 221). For Dr. Ferré, the liberal's optimism, based on reasonableness, would never satisfy the earnest reformer who was really aware of the spiritual bankruptcy of liberal pre-suppositions. What gives life, hope, unity, and dynamic persistence is the affirmation of faith, which cries out in the very midst of the struggle, "Hold on, for the ideal universe *is* on your side!"

While there is, I think, no *reasonable* ground for moral optimism unless fundamental ideals are definitely more than human artifice, there seems little, if any, justification for the view that human beings fail in morale apart from the *full assurance* of faith proposed by Dr. Ferré.

Indeed, one can believe in the objectivity of value without optimism. George Santayana, for example, supplements his "animal faith" in matter with the intuition of a realm of essences (among which are his values) independent of the human mind. Neither his "faith" nor his "reason" lead him to the point of asserting ultimate relevance and unity of purpose in the two realms. Thus, for him the problem of life is to find sufficient detachment from the concerns of the world to make possible the spiritual contemplation and enjoyment of these essences. While Dr. Ferré would not accept Santayana's view of value or type of objectivity, the point remains that belief in the objectivity of values does not necessarily give all the courage and "concern" which he assumes to be characteristic of "faith."

In any case, to suppose that "liberalism" or any other "ism" cannot have the inspirational value which is needed to face human suffering and sin is to forget the complexity and uniqueness of individual motivational systems. Right or wrong, for some, a faith in the transforming power of ideals which depends upon antecedent confidence in their com-

plete reality betrays a lack of moral courage, and connotes an unwillingness to throw the dice of life if they are not loaded in our favor. No personal motivational set, nevertheless, must be allowed to mitigate the scope of reason, in the interests of psychological certitude. Yet, how much of the contemporary neo-orthodox and anti-liberal reaction is based on the conviction that the liberal thesis simply does not have adequate emotional drive behind it? After all, if there are liberals who do not have the courage to live according to their best reasoned ideals, there are non-liberals who do not have courage to check their ideals by reason. I am not saying that motivational problems are not important. They are important once we have a fairly reasonable idea of what the truth about reality is; they are increasingly important as we approach the "live option" of James in the face of equally reasonable but contradictory hypotheses. But the desire for whatever gives each of us, or all of us, certitude cannot dictate the limitations of reasoning. We shall indeed be approaching the slough of psychological relativity—in the very attempt to assure objectivity!

However, pursuing the motivational aspect of the problem a moment longer, *does* confidence even in Dr. Ferré's system spring from the belief that somewhere, somehow, ultimate ideals are "eminently real"? Does it stem even from the belief that these ideals can transform actuality? Or does it, in the last analysis, spring from the realization that actuality has already been transformed enough by ideals to warrant further expectations of improvement? In other words, much as men may say that their faith rests in the "reality" of ideals in Dr. Ferré's sense, does it not, in fact, rest on the actuality of ideals in the past and the present? Would they go on believing in God if the actual realization of ideals, if the transformation of the actual by the ideal, was so fragmentary as to be really exceptional? When a veritable storm of evil fell on Job, when the ideal seemed to have departed for good, was it not Job's memory of the day when it had been less fragmentary which helped him to exclaim: "Though He slay me, yet will I trust him"? Unless men find their ideal sufficiently realized in their lives or in the lives of others (and they may vary as to what "sufficiency" actually involves for them), it is questionable whether they will gain inspiration from the unactualized reality of ideals. The motivational problem is not lastingly or legitimately solved by assurances that unactualized ideals are real. Whatever the final theory as to the reality of ideals, whatever his source of confi-

dence in ideals, man can and does find confidence in the actual tendencies which make for goodness in his own life, in that of others, and in the world.

V

THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN FAITH AND REASON

Reason and Inspiration both, then, must take off from, and never lose sight of, actuality. "Reason" cannot be reasonable unless it correlates the f-*acts* of ideals with the remainder of actuality; courage and "assurance" cannot be grounded unless the actual has yielded the growth of ideals and the promise of future fruits. Why not start, then, with the actual world and give our possible ideals meaning in the light of it? The possible has no empirical meaning apart from the actual. This we have seen to be the crucial problem in Dr. Ferré's exposition. He has met the same difficulty which has dogged all the parallelisms and dichotomies, of time and eternity, of the real and the actual, of the permanent and the changing, since the beginning of reflective thought. Once he has divided being into the ideal and the actual he must give some account of their relation which will satisfy the requirements set by the fact that some actuality resembles the ideal. To be clear enough to planning human beings, the ideal must be expressed in terms of transformation *of the actual.* Yet, in the last analysis, the concrete meaning of the ideal cannot be stated except in terms of the past, present, or possible *actual.*

It is here that Dr. Ferré's own doubts about the independence of the ideal from the check of reason begins to occur. Faith, in his view, is not the test of its own relevance. Yet patchwork rather than inner coherence is suggested by his conclusion that reason is basically irrelevant to the truth and reality of ideals, though relevant to their actualization. For, if reason (as he conceives it) can grasp the meaning of ideals without reference to actuality, why can she not derive these ideals in the first place? *If ideals are definable in any other way than by their implications for actuality, then, so far as we know, they must either be irrelevant to actuality, or be relevant by chance!* If faith begins where the actual leaves off, as Dr. Ferré says in another place, then that faith, to be relevant in the future, must never leave the realm of the probable as it is defined from with the actual. Once "ideality" becomes an independent dimension of being, that very fact creates the problem of relevance between the various dimensions. To repeat, if the realms of reason and

faith are discontinuous orders, any relevance they have can be only of a hit-or-miss sort. If faith still insists that the ideal can transform the real, it is because that faith has a hidden postulate, namely, that the ideal and the actual are constructed so that they ultimately can constitute a richer and harmonious whole. Thus, the puzzle which independent orders of being make of the universe is put together again either by carefully trimming the parts, or by an assumption contradicted in the first statement.

But, as already suggested, there is a way in which the continuity between faith and reason, the ideal and the actual, can be asserted without creating the problems suggested above. This is by unloading faith of *any specific existential assertions* and using the term to indicate that phase of life in which the volitional complements the reflective, not by added assertions, but by action in accordance with the reasonable. The *content* of faith here is provided by the possibilities of the total empirical situation as seen by reasonable, imaginative analysis and synthesis of the *whole* of conscious experience. The function of faith is not to make independent affirmations about the universe, but to will the best insight available to the individual. Rather than saying with Dr. Ferré that "Faith is basically a will to believe, while reason is basically a challenge to belief" (p. 218), we would say that Faith is the will to believe what empirical reason (or coherence) challenges us to believe.

It helps, in this discussion, to remember that faith and reason are both abstracts from the living whole of conscious experience; they are phases in the struggle of man to find and adjust to reality. The rational phase finds itself discriminating (reasoning or rationalizing about) the direction in which dynamic motives are to go. Jammed in the struggle between non-rational drives within the self and "brute" forces outside, the intellect, if it achieves reasonableness, guides by systematized observation of the relation between drives and the rest of his own and others' experience. At every point faith takes its cue from reason or unreason. Neither reason nor unreasoned drives can grant the individual assurance or certitude that his action will be ultimately satisfactory. Whether a person acts by reason, or wills to persist in unreasonable activity, he is betting his life. Faith itself is not a matter of choice; only the kind of faith is!

Returning now to the problem of ideals, we can begin at the very point at which ideals have meaning and relevance to life. Concrete rea-

soning about the relation of man's abilities and desires to each other and to the natural world eventuates in plans or ideals. The various satisfactions actually achieved in human experience and in our own living need to be evaluated in relation to each other and the imaginative possibilities they suggest. Such reasonable ideals, built upon past experiences with a view to future experiments, are not direct impositions upon life, but are generalizations drawn from total human experience, sensory and non-sensory. They are hypothetical formulations of the satisfactions open to us in the actual and empirically probable world. At no point can we *prove* beyond a doubt that our fundamental ideals or approved purposes are supported by similar ideals and purposes which are integral or intrinsic to the whole cosmic process. But the reflective man who is willing to guide his life by reasonable probabilities which overlook no facts, even as they integrate all known information, such a man can believe that his ideals, arising as they do out of his conscious interaction with his world, suggest a governing clue to the nature of the cosmos.

A world in which there are the values already realized by man, and further realizable by him, is hardly intelligible if the possibility of values is merely accidental. The problem of evil is neither intellectually nor practically insoluble. Even if it were, it should not blind us to the actual and empirical possibilities of goodness. This is not the place to develop a philosophy of religion, but such reasoning does suggest that the lasting and catholic ideals we develop are consistent with the purpose of the Maker, and that our constant task is to see that our ideals do take into account the growing whole of reality and not merely our present concerns.

But nowhere in this line of reasoning is there *certainty*, or complete *assurance*. There is room for doubt and scepticism. Yet, suicide rejected, men must make some bet with the universe; they must live by *some option*. Therefore, consciously or unconsciously, they place their bets with incomplete knowledge and in hope. Faith is, therefore, part and parcel of any life which rises sufficiently above blind impulse and mere desire to make a plan. The lower animals have no faith, for they cannot reflect on life's possibilities. For man no plan is certain; the only choices before him are the choices granted by his analysis of his cosmic predicament. Through volitional faith the reasonable man affirms, at the point of enactment, the ideals his reason has approved. The religious theorist with

his doubts now puts his doubts aside and sets his jaw; he can reasonably do no other! The believer, in particular, bets his life that there is a God with whose purposes his own ideals are consistent.

Faith reveals no new order, closed to reason. It pledges the whole of one's future to the desirable Order which reason asserts to be both actual in the historical process, and capable of further realization. The ideals of science, the ideals of religion, the ideals of the humanitarian, all die of incomplete realization without faith. But without reason men may give their lives to false and irrelevant ideals even as they blind themselves to actual possibilities. Thus, Faith and Reason are two poles in the continuum of life. Actuality suggests to reason the ideal order as the complete meaning and satisfaction of the actual. Faith dies, if need be, on the cross suggested by reasonable idealism.

RUSSIAN RELIGION TODAY: A REVIEW ARTICLE

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ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE DOCUMENTS which has come out of Russia since the Revolution is a volume published in the summer of 1942 by the Patriarchate of Moscow, with the title, *The Truth about Religion in Russia*.[1] It consists of a collection of essays and statements by various leading ecclesiastical personages in Russia, and has been put together by an editorial committee consisting of Right Rev. Nikolai Yarushevich, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, Prof. Gregory P. Georgievski, of the Cathedral of the Epiphany in Moscow, and Rev. Alexander P. Smirnov, proto-hieros of the Nikolo-Kuznetskoi Church in Moscow. It opens with a preface by the Patriarch and Metropolitan of Moscow, Sergius, and an address made by him to his clergy at the outbreak of the war with Germany June 22, 1941.

The immediate occasion of this book was the necessity of defining the position of Orthodoxy in Russia toward the war and toward the claim of German Fascism to be the champion of Russian Christian and even Russian ecclesiastical interests. The editors have, however, dealt more broadly with the present state of religion in Russia and the conditions under which it operates under the Soviet regime. The book is divided into two main parts, the first of which is concerned with the Russian Orthodox Church's loyalty to its own country, its attitude to the war, the patriotic enthusiasm among its laity and clergy, and the support given to this enthusiasm outside Russia. The second part contains an account of the overt hostility of Nazis and Fascists to the practice of Orthodoxy, and the systematic persecution of Christians and the violation of church property in occupied areas. Appendices include official documents which serve as *pièces justificatives* for statements made in the body of the book.

In his preface, Patriarch Sergius gives a clear and moving apologia for that section of Orthodoxy which has come to terms with the Bolshevik government and its social system without a sense of compromise with its fundamentally Christian character, or its right to represent the Universal Church in its own land. The Patriarch points out that the at-

1. *Pravda o religii v Rossii* (Moscow, 1942).

tack on his position now comes largely from outside Russia and has been led by people to whom Russian Orthodoxy, disassociated from Russian imperialism and in any status other than that of a privileged state church, was repugnant and blasphemous. He writes:

> The ecclesiastical bourgeoisie sees persecution mainly in the separation of the government from its ancient alliance with the church, in consequence of which the Church, more accurately ecclesiastical institutions like the monasteries, and the clergy as a class or profession, have lost certain rights: the possession of land even for commercial enterprises, of various class privileges in contrast with the common people, etc. The common Orthodox people, meanwhile, hearing Christ's injunctions to the Apostles and reading the Pauline Epistles or the lives of any of the heroes of Christianity, like S. John Chrysostom, were convinced that they saw in the recent change, not persecution but rather a return to the apostolic age, when the church and its adherents walked in the way to which they had been called by Christ, when they looked upon their adherence not as a profession among other secular professions, providing them with the means of livelihood but as a response to a summons to Christ (p. 9).

The Patriarch admits that after the revolution the church suffered severe losses, but maintains that these represented largely the defection of people who either confused political and religious issues or who were basically secular in their interests and broke away from the church as soon as it ceased to be disadvantageous to do so:

> In a word, inconceivable chaos prevailed in our church, reminiscent of the condition of the Universal Church at the time of the Arian controversy, as described by Basil the Great. In the face of what appeared to be the imminent dissolution of the whole Russian Church, our Patriarchate could not count on protection or aid from the outside, nor in principle did it expect such aid. Our sister churches could only offer their sympathy, besides which having no perspective on our ecclesiastical affairs, they sometimes did not rightly know in what particular direction they should extend their sympathy. In our external position of helplessness, we could count only on the moral power of established truth, which had more than once in the past saved the church from final disintegration. And we were not disappointed in our expectation. We have the courage to say this in spite of the defects of our administration. Our Russian Church has not been distracted and tormented by every blast of circumstance. It has maintained uncompromisingly the consciousness of its tradition as well as its traditionally recognized authority, viz. its blessed succession from the Universal Church and its recognized place in the company of Orthodox autocephalous churches (p. 11).

As a consequence of this view the attitude of the church toward the nation must inevitably be pastoral, and its first concern must be for its flock. The support of the church against the Nazi invaders of Russia was fortified by its own primitive instinct for the care of its charges. It could support the government not for its own gain in the immediate or remote future, but because it shared the state's interest in the preservation and welfare of the Russian people. It is in the light of this common concern that the much disputed question of prayers by the church for the Bolshevik government was settled. The church prays for the State now as formerly, not for its own profit but in fulfillment of an obligation imposed upon it by the divine will. In this respect the Patriarch claims with some justice that the church under his jurisdiction differs from all dissidents at home or abroad, many of whom pray openly not for the dethroned imperial house of Russia but for Hitler and foreign fascist powers.[2]

The Patriarch's preface is followed by a reprint of his charge to the clergy at the outbreak of hostilities with Germany, June 22, 1941. This remarkable address ranks high among the expressions of Christian patriotism evoked by the present war. Recalling the parallelism between the German invasion and those of the Tatars under Batu Khan, the German knights, the Swedes under Charles XII, and the French under Napoleon, the Patriarch observes,

> It is not the first time that the Russian people have had to endure such trials. With God's help and in his good time, it will scatter the hostile Fascist forces like ashes. Our ancestors did not lose heart even under the most adverse circumstances, because they were mindful not of personal danger and concerns but of their sacred duty to their country and faith, and they emerged victorious. We shall not sully their glorious name and we, Orthodox, are their kindred in flesh and in faith. Our homeland will be protected by arms and by every national means, by a complete readiness to serve our country in this terrible hour of trial in the way each one is able. There is work for laborers, farmers, scientists, women and men, young and old. Everyone must take on his share of work, of care and of skill in the common enterprise. . . . Our Orthodox Church has always shared the nation's destiny. With it she has undergone trials and taken comfort in its successes. She will not abandon her country on this occasion. . . . It is for us to be especially mindful of Christ's command, "Greater love has no one than he who lays down his life for his friends." Not only he who dies on the field of battle lays down his life for his country and its well-being but also every-

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 12 f.

one who sacrifices himself, his health or personal advantage, for the nation. At such a time, when our country is mobilizing everyone for the task, it is not enough for us, the pastors of the church, merely to look silently on what goes on about us, to encourage the timid, to comfort the distressed, to recall the hesitant to duty and God's will. But if, in addition to this, the silence of the pastor indicates his carelessness of the flock and by subtle reasoning counts the possible gains from abroad, that will be direct treason to his country and to his pastoral obligation, in proportion to the Church's need of pastors, who really bear their responsibility "for Jesus' sake and not for a morsel of bread," as S. Demetrius of Rostov expresses it. Let us lay down our own lives with those of our flock. Countless thousands of our Orthodox soldiers have trod the way of sacrifice and have laid down their lives for the nation and the faith at all times of hostile invasion of our nation. They died heedless of glory. Considering only the fact that the nation had need of their sacrifices, they made that sacrifice in every way that they could, even with their lives. The Church of Christ gives its blessing to all the Orthodox for the protection of the sacred boundaries of our nation. God grant us victory (pp. 16 f.).

In describing the extent to which freedom in the practice of religion is permitted by the Bolshevik government, the editors have their own view of the significance for the church of the famous Article 13 of the Constitution, "On freedom of conscience."[3] They point out (pp. 22 f.) that the reforms of Peter the Great, by which the Holy Synod replaced the patriarchate but was itself subject to the will of the tsar as head of church and state, resulted in the practical subordination of the church in both the spiritual and temporal spheres. The bureaucratic system gripped the church like a vise and under the supervision of the High Procurator all ecclesiastical activities were observed and controlled by secular government agents. In the imperial code of laws over a thousand articles are found defining the rights of church and state in their spheres of common interests. The life of the church became paralyzed under this

3. The original draft of this decree read: "For the purpose of securing real freedom of conscience for the workers, the church is declared separate from the government and the schools from the church. But freedom for religion and anti-religious propaganda is recognized for every citizen," I. Phioletov, *Tserko i gosuvdarstvo po sovetskomu pravu* (1923), p. 61. This was amended, May 22, 1929, to read "freedom for the practice of religious cults and for anti-religious propaganda," thus eliminating the freedom for religious propaganda which had always been restricted in practice by the Communist Party, P. Miliukov, *Outlines of Russian Culture,* Part 1: *Religion and the Church* (Philadelphia, 1942), p. 199. The revised text appears as Article 14 of the revised Constitution of 1936. Cf. the decrees, "On the separation of the church from the state" (Jan. 23, 1918) and, "On the liquidation of ecclesiastical institutions" (Aug. 22, 1918), Phioletov, *op. cit.,* pp. 12, 14.

protective regimentation. Through the decree on "On freedom of conscience" the church regained liberty to manage its own affairs and pursue its own spiritual aims without interference. The editors do not deny that this freedom was matched by attacks on church property and an outbreak of anti-religious propaganda which would not have been allowed under the imperial regime and which the church could only deplore, and they admit that, in the years following the October revolution, many Orthodox Christians were tried or sentenced for their ecclesiastical views and activities. They maintain, however, that the church became free within her own sphere to think and worship as she liked and that the Bolshevik government was concerned not with piety but with political sympathies and acts. These were, indeed, often masked by professions of Christianity, but they were basically political in character and as such the affair of the state. The church has no interest in defending such people, for "The Orthodox church itself has loudly and resolutely condemned those of its adherents who deviate from the straight line of honest loyalty in their attitude toward the Soviet rule." A group of this type under the leadership of the Metropolitan of Leningrad, Joseph, was condemned by Sergius himself, as dissenters.

In his essay on the Patriarchs Tichon and Sergius, Archbishop Sergius (p. 29) depicts the former not only as the staunch defender of a disestablished Russian Orthodoxy but also as the enthusiastic supporter of friendly relations between the church and the Bolshevik state.

> The attitude of the Orthodox Church to the Bolshevik government and its measures is clearly defined in the testament of the supreme head of the Russian Church, Most Rev. Patriarch Tichon. "In the year of civil strifes," he writes in his Testament, "according to God's will—without which nothing in the world occurs—the Soviet government came into power and assumed the difficult responsibility of clearing away the results of a bloody war and horrible starvation." In a letter to the arch-priests and pastors, Patriarch Tichon publicly declared the new order of things and the Soviet rule to be the national government. "It is time for the faithful to understand the Christian point of view that the destinies of nations are disposed by God and to accept all circumstances as indications of God's will." . . . The Most Rev. Patriarch concludes his Testament with these words, . . . "we beseech you with a quiet conscience and without fear of sinning against our holy faith, to submit to Soviet rule not from fear but on grounds of conscience, remembering the words of the Apostle, 'Let every soul be subject to a higher power,' etc. (Rom. 13.1)" (pp. 42, 46).

One of the last plans of the old Patriarch was to secure for his church legal registration as a corporate body, but his death prevented its fulfillment.

The career of the present Patriarch is sketched in greater detail. His secular name is Ivan Nikolaevich Staragorodskii, and he was born in the town of Arzamas. He received his education at the Petersburgh Ecclesiastical Academy, from which he was graduated in 1890. He immediately took monastic vows and was sent as a missionary to Japan, where he remained three years and then returned to Petersburgh as instructor in his old college. In the following year he became rector of the embassy church in Athens and was made an archimandrite. In 1895 he received the degree of Master of Theology for a dissertation on "The Orthodox Doctrine of Salvation." In 1897 he returned to Japan, but reappeared in Petersburgh in 1899 as inspector of the Ecclesiastical Academy. In 1901 he was made bishop and rector of the Academy, and a month after this appointment he was nominated vicar of the Petersburgh exarchy. In 1905 he was made archbishop of Finland, and in 1906 was summoned by the Holy Synod as the head of its educational committee, taking an active part in the textual revision of the liturgical books. After the revolution he continued to be active in ecclesiastical politics, taking part in the All-Russian synod of 1917-18, when he was named metropolitan and served afterwards in the cathedrals of Vladimir and Nizhni-Novgorod. In 1925, by the testament of the acting Patriarch Peter, Sergius took over the administration of the whole Russian church. In recognition of his work as proto-hierarch he was made Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna, April 19, 1934.

In his attitude toward the state, Sergius advocated the policy that the Soviet state represented the real government of Russia and therefore deserved the support and prayers of the church in accordance with accepted doctrine (Rom. 13.5). He ordered prayers for the government in all churches under his jurisdiction and, after the outbreak of war with Germany, added prayers for the success of Bolshevik Russian arms. He also revived the plan for legalizing the position of his church and carried it through successfully. This new alliance between church and state proved especially fruitful after the outbreak of the war with Germany, and assured the government the unequivocal support of the Orthodox citizens in the war against Fascism. A considerable part of the

book is occupied by reports of impressive contributions made by parishes, not all in the great metropolitan centers, to the defense fund. The aggregate runs to millions of rubles. Important as this financial aid has been, the moral encouragement given to Russian patriotism by Sergius and his clergy must be equally if not more significant. Numerous testimonials are given of the way in which the faithful flock to the churches to pray for Russian victory and the welfare of the Russian army. This naturally has worked both ways, but the church's recognition of the Bolshevik state opened its own doors to those who felt the pressure of national emergency forcing upon them the ancient need for a security not merely material or social, but cosmic and absolute.

It has been evident at several points with what suspicion and resentment the church of Tichon and Sergius has regarded the groups, mainly outside Russia, which opposed the recognition of the Bolshevik state and any official accommodation to its regime. This problem, along with the general question of Christian patriotism in Russia, became more acute upon the outbreak of war with Germany. As the war continued and increasing areas of Russian territory fell into German hands, the political sympathies were strained by Nazi pressure and persecution, and the Patriarch's difficulties in maintaining patriotism as an integral part of piety increased. Not unnaturally this situation was peculiarly acute in the Ukraine. A noble example of the spirit inspired among the clergy by the Patriarch was given by Nikolai,[4] Metropolitan Exarch of the Western Provinces of the Ukraine, who, when forced to abandon his see at Lutzk, refused to seek refuge in a safer place and traveled ceaselessly along the German front encouraging the soldiers and civilian population. For this service he was appointed Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia and Exarch of the entire Ukraine.

In spite of their confidence in the line they have taken at home, it is natural that the leaders of Orthodoxy in Russia should be concerned about the approval of their co-religionists abroad. In soliciting aid for the Red Army Sergius did not overlook the possibilities of financial aid from America.[5] Friendly relationships have also been established with the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Constantinople.[6] Since the beginning

4. *Pravda o religii v Rossii*, p. 112.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 279.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

of the conflict with Germany the warmest expressions of sympathy and support have come from all these quarters accompanied by prayers for Russian victory. The Patriarch of Alexandria sent this unambiguous message:

> Serge locum tenens patriarch russe, Moscou = Eglise orthodoxe – apostolique d'Aléxandrie est fière des victoires successives éclatantes des armes russes tendant à la déstruction complète de tout effort des puissances d'enfer. Félicitons cordialement vous et église russe orthodoxe et bénissons scs efforts qui contribueront au triomphe des alliés et assureront la paix au monde (p. 268).

An important indication of the solidarity of Orthodoxy under the Moscow patriarchate is offered by the resolute opposition to Fascism on the part of its sister churches in countries occupied by the Germans. In Bulgaria, Metropolitan Stephen,[7] in Jugoslavia, Bishop Nikolai, and in Slovenia and Slovakia, the Orthodox clergy in general were singled out for persecution because of their obstinate national spirit and resolute opposition to the invaders and their New Order. Everywhere the common resistance to the anti-Christian program of Fascism has drawn the Orthodox together and cemented friendly relations, even with churches outside their jurisdiction such as the Anglican and Roman Catholic.[8] The Archbishop of Canterbury's cordial recognition of the Russian achievement, and the need of practical collaboration with Rome against a common foe in Poland and the Balkans, have done much to increase a sense of brotherhood between the higher clergy of Russia and those of her allies.

The last hundred pages of the book are filled with a melancholy but fully documented record of the persecution of Orthodoxy in occupied territories, the desecration of shrines and violation of church property, and the barbaric treatment of Christians both clerical and lay.

I have given, in the foregoing pages, a flat summary of the contents of this most remarkable book. It remains to estimate its reliability and importance and to form some view of the significance of the facts which it records. To appreciate its full value it would probably be a mistake to insist mainly on the details of its account. There appears no reason to distrust them, and they obviously add considerably to our knowledge

7. *Ibid.*, p. 293.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 298.

of contemporary church history in Slavic countries. More important, however, than this is the general picture given of the Orthodox Church as a going concern in Russia under Patriarch Sergius.

Students of modern Slavic church history are inevitably bewildered by the confusion of institutions and ideas prevalent in Orthodoxy since the last war. In part this is due to the close association of Orthodoxy with the political life of the countries to which it is indigenous, and is a reflection of the general turmoil in international politics which followed the World War of 1914-18.

So far as Russian Orthodoxy, however, is concerned, certain broad outlines emerge. The first impact of the Bolshevik rule upon the established church produced general devastation. Deprived of property and privilege and of the moral prestige it had enjoyed, at least in theory, under the old regime, the most important problem was to discover terms on which the church could survive at all. Three solutions were attempted. The first was flight and the provisional establishment of a church in exile. The second was to maintain a subterranean ecclesiastical life in Russia, escaping as far as possible the attention of the authorities and eluding their agents. The extent to which this has been successful is not known, but there is evidence that its effectiveness has not been negligible. The third solution was to face squarely the actual situation in Russia, to recognize in principle and practice the existence of the Bolshevik state as the legitimate and established government of the country, to strip religion of all its secondary equipment and impedimenta and to carry on the ecclesiastical tradition without loss of continuity in the essential forms of ministration. The church under Sergius represents the successful issue of this third enterprise.

It cannot have been an easy venture to have risked the future of Russian Orthodoxy on the recognition of the Bolshevik state, the avowed hostility of whose leaders had caused so much damage and suffering in Orthodoxy in the early years of its power. The favorable interpretation given to the decree on "Liberty of Conscience" in the Constitution is hardly reconcilable with that placed upon it by state officials in their dealings with Christian persons and property. The anti-religious educational policy of the government was not confined to attacks on the old association of church and state, but also upon theology and the practice of religion as radically opposed to the fundamental social and cultural aims of the new government. All this is, however, better known

to the editors of *The Truth about Religion in Russia* than to us. The insight into Russian mentality and the foresight of a certain return to the values of religion indicates the kind of vision by which history is made and directed. The more unpromising the situation in the 20's is envisaged, the more credit accrues to the astuteness and judgment of Sergius and his associates. In the complex of judgments which determined their course, a deep and pastoral sense of responsibility toward the actual religious needs of the Russian people predominated. These common folk could find no refuge in the ivory towers of foreign capitals nor be patronized by the exiled courts of grand dukes and princes. Whether loyal or disloyal to the ancient creed, the Russian people were the flock of Russian pastors, and the church of Sergius holds the shepherds who stayed on the ground to care for them. The decision to do this was dangerous and in the eyes of many wrong-headed, but it required not only the courage of conviction but also a single-minded concern for the cure of souls.

It is a defect of the present volume that the characters of the two patriarchs, Tichon and Sergius, stand out with unequal clarity. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that the development of Tichon's views on the co-operation between the church and the Bolshevik state is extremely obscure.[9] It is quite certain that, until his arrest in 1922, the Patriarch was an uncompromising opponent of the new political order. His public anathema of the revolutionaries in which he described them in scarcely conciliatory terms as "monsters of the human race," and forbade any association with them was confirmed by his remarks on the appropriation of church treasure for relief in the famine of 1922. The evidence appears conclusive that his personal sympathies were all tsarist and that his activities as far as possible favored the imperial cause. During his imprisonment in 1923 he appears to have experienced a change of heart, and admitted his error in opposing and anathematizing the government in a statement to the civil court in 1923 by which he secured his release from prison. In a proclamation, June 28, 1923, he declared himself to be no enemy of the existing state and prepared "decisively (to) condemn any attack upon the Soviet government, no matter

9. W. C. Emhardt, *Religion in Soviet Russian* (Milwaukee, 1929), pp. 14, 127; Miliukov, *op. cit.*, pp. 156 f.; N. S. Timashev, *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1942* (New York, 1942), p. 28; M. Spinka, *The Church in the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1927), *passim.*

from where it comes." In his so-called Testament, a document written in hospital the day he died and published by his successor, Metropolitan Peter, he formally recognized the Soviet government as ordained of God and advocated the unreserved co-operation of the church with its authority. It is from this source that most of the quotations of his views given by the editors of *The Truth about Religion* are drawn.

Opinion is divided on the genuineness of the "Testament." Hecker writes, "Many suspect that the 'will' was written by Metropolitan Peter himself and given to Tichon to sign before he drew his last breath"; but he recognizes its importance as "something of a declaration to the government of the policy of the new ruler of the church," designed "to assure it of his intention to carry through this 'will' of the late Patriarch."[10] Miliukov, however, accepts its genuineness and points out that, "in writing his appeal the Patriarch never thought it would be his last testament, for he believed fully in his recovery and even dated the document from the Don Monastery, to which he expected to return on leaving the hospital."[11] Whatever may have been the facts about the Testament, the truth seems to be that Tichon was a churchman of the old school and a politician of no great vision. His acceptance of the Patriarchy was as unenthusiastic as it had been unexpected, and he exhibited a chronic disposition to abdicate his office when met with any formidable opposition.

The question arises why the editors of our volume are concerned with claiming the sanction of so ambiguous a figure as the forerunner of the much more positive and powerful Sergius. The answer to this is probably fourfold: (1) Tichon enjoyed by virtue of his genial personal qualities, distinguished service, and stout championship of the church a considerable prestige among the Orthodox generally. (2) Although recently revived in Russia, the patriarchate is the natural focal point of Orthodox loyalty, especially since the Holy Synod has been disbanded and no body of equivalent standing exists in its place. (3) Whether or not the so-called Testament be genuine, it was widely accepted as such in Russia and was evidence that the first Patriarch after the Revolution recognized the legitimacy of the Soviet state as the real government of Russia. (4) Both as patriarch and as an individual, Tichon was an im-

10. J. Hecker, *Religion under the Soviets* (New York, 1927), p. 119.
11. Miliukov, *op cit.*, p. 187.

portant link with the past and a guarantee that the church functioning in Russia could not be fairly accused of having broken the line of tradition. For this purpose the dual character of Tichon as defender of the ancient church in the time of its greatest trial and as author of the Testament, the reconciler of church and state, was of the greatest value. It should, however, be remembered that the recognition of the Soviet state was not due in the first instance to the initiative of the patriarchate, but to the steady pressure of the more liberal clergy who gradually and by various means won the patriarchate to their view.

A much livelier picture emerges of the present acting Patriarch Sergius. He appears to be the first man of historic stature produced by the church under Bolshevik rule. An accomplished diplomat, a trained theologian and an experienced pastor even in the mission field, Sergius stands in marked contrast to the wavering Tichon and the unhappy Peter. In addition to these qualities, Sergius is a master of simple and effective language, and it is to be hoped that a collection of his addresses, especially his war addresses, may be translated into English when the war is over. His decisions are clear-cut and incisive, and are obviously formulated by a mind thoroughly alive to the issues of his own time and foreign to that artificial and unyielding Byzantinism which has so often characterized the mentality of his predecessors and opponents. There can be little doubt that, in comparison with the exiled factions and rival groups in Russia, the Orthodox church under Sergius exhibits the most convincing signs of vigor and effectiveness and gives the most encouraging promise of survival and permanence.

A church, however, needs in the long run more than a leader. A large part of the material included in *The Truth about Religion in Russia* is designed to show the massive support enjoyed by the church among the faithful in Russia. The facsimiles of checks covering parochial contributions to the war fund, the pictures of historic church buildings still intact and functioning, the interior views of churches during the Liturgy and on festival occasions are all evidence of active loyalty to the old religion and its practise. Unfortunately little is said or shown that sheds much light on the attitude of youth and especially young men. In the photographs of church services the buildings are often crowded but mainly with women, and the few male figures that appear are middle-aged or old. This may or may not be significant, but it does suggest the question whether the campaign of the godless has not suc-

ceeded in winning the young and whether, without the support of the coming generation, the organization and able administration of Orthodoxy is more than a handsomely refurbished façade to conceal a progressively depopulated sanctuary.

Although the present volume deals inadequately with this acute problem, there are grounds for hope that young Russians have lost interest in the campaign of violence against religion and its ways and have begun to be positively attracted by the church. More surprising still, there appears to be in progress a slow but perceptible shift of attitude by the government toward the church. The great protagonists of the abolition of religion from Soviet society were Lenin, Trotsky, and Yaroslavsky, whose thinking in this regard was dominated by the influence of Marx and Engels. Stalin, however, appears never to have been so concerned with this aspect of Bolshevik ideology and, in recent years, to have given some support to the revival of religious interest which is gradually making itself felt in Russia. The publication of such a book as the one we have been considering is, in itself, highly significant in a state where there is real freedom to act only as the government pleases.

An illuminating analysis of this change has been made by Bolshakov.

> The Godless Movement, so vigorous in 1930, began to decline after 1932, first gradually and then rapidly. The Godless papers, Bezbojnik and Antireligiosnik, decreased alarmingly in size and circulation. Bezbojnik appeared in 1934 only thrice a month with four pages instead of eight pages. The review Antireligiosnik, which issued in 1931 30,000 copies monthly, with 128 pages each time, lost half of its size, became bi-monthly and retained only 12,000 subscribers in 1934. Since then the decline of the Godless Movement has never stopped, though every effort was made to revive it. This decline is closely related to the passing away of the generation which inspired the Movement. To the Old Bolsheviks, educated in the underworld of the Empire, the Church was the hated remnant of the former regime, which was to be destroyed. They hated it not only as Marxists, but as individuals as well, particularly if they were by origin not Orthodox but sectarians or Jews, who were in many ways restricted and kept down under the Empire. To the atheists, internationalists and professional rebels the Church was an abomination. It was quite different with the new Soviet government. They had never known the Imperial regime and were free of any personal hatred towards it. They were but little interested in the World Revolution. Their aim was to build in Russia a Communist State for workers and peasants, free of any oppression of man by man. The young generation loved its native country passionately, and was interested in its history, art, literature, and science. The Church was for them a relic of the past rather to be preserved than to be destroyed. The oppression of people for their

religious convictions seemed to them unworthy of the country of free men. These young men supported Stalin, who understood their aspirations and tried to lead their youth. The history of the Church now took a different course.[12]

In addition to this, the actual political situation in Russia has become unexpectedly favorable to the church. Ciliga points out that religious sentiment has never died out among the intellectuals and technicians who form an important and closely organized element in the Soviet state and that their support of the church, though often concealed, is unequivocal.[13] Stalin himself is fully aware that a dictatorship is too impermanent a form and presents an ideology of too narrow appeal to stabilize a government over a long period of time. The specter of rivals, especially among the high ranking military officers, is always present. It may be that Stalin's own early theological education has suggested to him that the church, amenable to the state as it now is, will serve his aims as it served the aims of the imperialist absolutism before him.

The war, too, has effected a change in morale. Even before the outbreak of hostilities with Germany, Bolshevik Russia had tended to become more nationalistic, more Russian than in the twenties. The term "national socialism," so inapplicable to the present German and Italian regimes, not unfairly describes the state of things in Russia today. Since the war, patriotism, in the sense of a fierce attachment to Russia and the defence of her rights and soil, has supervened over every other attachment except religion. The close association of these two elemental forces, religion and patriotism, has had a long history in Russia, and it seems not unlikely that the war is reviving that association. The ratification of Sergius as Patriarch by a council of higher clergy authorized by the state,[14] and still more the opening of a theological seminary in Moscow with government permission,[15] are striking concessions from a hitherto hostile state.[16] It is much too early to prophesy what the final result will be, but a more liberal political and economic order, once again penetrated by Christian values, may be one of the future aspects of the truth about religion in Russia.

12. S. Bolshakoff, *The Christian Church and the Soviet State* (London, 1942), p. 47.

13. A. Ciliga, *The Russian Enigma* (London, 1940), p. 285.

14. P. B. Anderson, "The Election of a Patriarch for the Russian Church," *The Living Church* (Sept. 26, 1943), p. 14.

15. *The Living Church* (Dec. 19, 1943), p. 10.

16. Cf. *Time* (Sept. 13, 1943), p. 45; (Sept. 27, 1943), p. 56; (Oct. 4, 1943), p. 54; (Jan. 17, 1944), p. 38.

BOOK REVIEWS

Origin Legend of the Navaho Flintway. By Father Berard Haile. (University of Chicago Publications in Anthropology, Linguistic Series) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943. 319 pp. $3.00.

Origin Legend of the Navaho Flintway is the second long text published by Father Berard on basic explanations of Navajo religion, the first having appeared in 1938.[1] The two records naturally invite comparison. Both are highly specialized, but the introductory discussion of the earlier work makes certain phases of the religion intelligible to the layman, whereas the same part of this book is much confused. It is doubtful if anyone untutored in Navajo ideas can understand any of it; there is even much which remains obscure to one familiar with Navajo life and thought. One has the feeling that the author wrote the *Flintway* when he understood very much less about the subject than he did when he wrote the *Enemy Way* four years previously.[2] The greatest contribution to the classification of Navajo ceremonials in this work is fogged by the fact that the recorder tried to evaluate one of his two versions as better or worse. A possible explanation of this lack of perspective is, doubtless, the fact that, although a great deal has been published about Navajo religion since 1934, the author cites only his own work and one of Matthews which was published in 1897.

Here there seem to be two accounts, one running parallel to the other in many details, and diverging in others. These, if properly handled, could have shown us the difference between branches or phases of the chant described, something we much want to know. Instead of skilfully eliciting such significance from his informants, the recorder takes the attitude that one is right, the other wrong, or at least uninformed. Such remarks as the following set the tone: "Minor details and useless repetition are quite frequent in Version B" (p. 290, note 26a); "The introduction of this group (of songs) is somewhat annoying . . ." (p. 6).

One can easily sympathize with the author if he gets bored with repetition, but one must remember always that nagging detail is the essence of the religion described, of such importance that the transposition of two lines in prayer or song, or of two ritualistic acts, or the omission of

1. *Origin Legend of the Navaho Enemy Way.* (Yale University Publications in Anthropology 17, New Haven, 1938).

2. See remarks on editing below.

even a single word may be considered so serious as to cost the singer's life, or that of the patient over whom he is chanting. The student of Navajo lore cannot afford to be annoyed at anything ritualistic if he wishes real understanding. The difference in songs is doubtless a distinguishing feature to be considered in connection with the use of the sacred altar properties and the restoration rite (pp. 148, 232; p. 292, notes 44, 45, 59; p. 293, note 86; p. 294, notes 88, 90, 91; p. 297, note 128; p. 306, notes 38, 39, 45, 55, 56; p. 307, note 63).

The author has conscientiously recorded these differences but, since he did not realize their importance, failed to get the significance we need almost desperately. A formulation of the problems with half a dozen skilfully put questions and a final synthesis would have lifted this great task from the class of "just another text" to an invaluable contribution. As it is, we can only suspect what is there, we cannot be sure.

The arrangement of this volume is much more satisfactory than that of the *Enemy Way* since the parallel records in Navajo and English allow one to find the words easily, even though the earlier work is printed, whereas this is done in a photographic process. In general, too, the translation is better, although there are places where it is obscure, others where it is amusing, and still others where it is even shocking, since it so thoroughly violates the spirit of the Navajo religion and language. For instance, Navajo uses the same word for the singer's medicine bundle, its wrapping, its collective contents, and each item of the contents. The Navajo knows by context whether he refers to one or the other. When all are rendered "pouch" some of the statements do not make sense in English. Another example, which I could possibly explain but which the reader certainly cannot, is, "By flintway his head, that, as it is in your interior is hatching . . ." (p. 71). It would have been better not to have attempted any translation of this at all. A false etymology is explained, "Mt. Taylor is dressed in *turquoise*, so that in sunlight it seems to have a *yellow* color" (p. 296, note 109, italics mine), thus leaving the reader more confounded by the explanation than by the Navajo words.

There is a moot question as to whether composition or lithoprinting should be used for specialized work of this kind. If one were to compare the two works here discussed, he could but choose printing, for its limitations require editing; this work had none, which is doubtless the rea-

son for the superiority of the first publication. The author uses Enemy Way in one title (and quotes it as Enemyway) and Flintway in the other. In note 44 (p. 292) it is said that sun songs are not found in Version B. In note 45 we read "Version B lets . . . medicine songs follow the sun songs."

The most stable part of a Navajo verb is its root, composed of not more than three sounds which, by the very definition of a root, cannot be separated. Throughout the texts the last sound may be carried over to another line (p. 120, l.24; p. 159, l.24; p. 232, l.15; p. 234, l.7). The lines of the text are not numbered; this is an inexcusable oversight, and another is the fact that the notes do not always correspond with the numbers given in the text (p. 231, note 223 is given for note 233; p. 235, note 242 for 244). Errors like these are common throughout the book.

The reader who wants to use this book must provide himself with much more than his ordinary allotment of time and should not expect to be overly compensated by its expenditure.

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The Problem of Ezekiel: An Inductive Study. By WILLIAM A. IRWIN. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943. Lithoprinted. xx + 344 pp. $3.00.

When Professor Irwin, in 1941, published a revised edition of *The Prophets and Their Times,* by J. M. P. Smith, this reviewer expressed the hope (*Journal of Bible and Religion,* IX [1941], 183) that Dr. Irwin would expand the chapter on Ezekiel, which he rewrote entirely, into a monograph "and substantiate his conclusion that 'the Book of Ezekiel is not the father, but the child of Judaism.' " Happily, with the publication of this substantial volume, his hope has been fulfilled. We now have Irwin's detailed study of "The Problem of Ezekiel," in which "the position . . . set forth diverges at several points from the previous sketch" (p. vii).

The work is divided into three parts: The Problem, Induction, and Conclusions. In the first part Irwin (like the reviewer in his *Introduction to the Old Testament,* p. 525) recognizes that the problem of Ezekiel is threefold: Is the book the work of Ezekiel or is it pseudony-

mous? Is it of united authorship? Was it written in Palestine or in Babylonia? (see p. 3). He then proceeds to summarize and criticize the earlier attempts to solve these problems, giving us a good survey of recent Ezekiel research. It is not surprising that the reviewer's own attempt to solve these problems should not be discussed, since Irwin had dismissed it as a denial *in toto* of any validity of biblical criticism (*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, 1 [1942] 494), but the failure to even mention O. Eissfeldt's *Einleitung in das Alte Testament* (1934) is puzzling, unless it is also classed among uncritical books. In any case, this survey of critical opinion on Ezekiel leads to the pessimistic conclusion that "at this moment the work of the prophet Ezekiel is cloaked in the darkest obscurity. No one at all has given us reason to believe that he knows what the prophet taught" (p. 29; cf. p. 224, etc.).

Irwin's book was written to bring light into this darkness. He admits, however, that this result of ten year's work does not claim finality in all details (p. vii). Nevertheless, he is convinced that his results "are not dogmatic but built up by careful induction" (p. xi)—which presumably is not to be taken as a wholesale condemnation of earlier studies. This "careful induction" is presented in the second part of the book, in a study of the individual chapters of Ezekiel discussed in a "seeming erratic order . . . dictated by results inductively determined" (p. 281) as follows: 15, 4-5, 6, 36, 11:14-25, 24, 21, 7, 12, 17, 19, 33, 18, 34, 22, etc.

The third part, "Conclusions," will probably be of greatest interest to the average reader of the book, eager to discover, after centuries of misinterpretation, what Ezekiel wrote and taught. Here Irwin states that only one of the fourteen dates given in Ezekiel's book may be authentic, namely the puzzling "thirtieth year" in 1:1, which "even if spurious" refers to "Ezekiel's age" at the time of his call (p. 268)—most extraordinary in view of the attached mention to the fifth day of the fourth month. More important are the "criteria" discovered by Irwin for determining what parts of his book Ezekiel actually wrote. For this is the crucial problem. If objective, infallible, criteria to determine what is genuine and what is spurious in the Book of Ezekiel can be established, then its riddles can be solved, in the main, once for all. Unfortunately, all students will hardly agree that Irwin's criteria are "objective." For instance, while Irwin has concluded that the formula, "And the word of the Lord came to me saying" is "typical of the genuine oracles" (p. 269) but all the dates are spurious, O. Eissfeldt (*op. cit.*, pp. 419 f.)

concludes that all concrete and specific historical accounts are introduced by dates (except 12:1-20), while the speeches introduced by that formula are vague about time and place. Upon closer examination, most of the objective and inductive criteria adduced by Irwin prove uncertain. The above mentioned formula is occasionally used to introduce questionable oracles and is not always used for genuine ones (p. 269). The formula, "Therefore say unto them" (or the like) is used by Ezekiel, but also two or three times by his "commentators" (pp. 273 f.). Comments on Ezekiel's oracles may be genuine or spurious (p. 274). "The bare command to prophecy . . . occurs in four genuine passages but in eleven spurious ones" (p. 275). "The same confused situation holds in the contents of the oracles. Much of Ezekiel's phraseology is copied by the commentators" (p. 276). Such being the case, "the overlap of genuine and spurious features may well indeed give the impression that in the end any conclusion is but a matter of subjective judgment" (p. 277).

Thus the reviewer is driven to the inference that Irwin's attempt to discover purely objective criteria for a literary criticism of Ezekiel has not been successful. He fully agrees with the statement that "no formulation of guides and criteria can ever provide ultimate rules for the dissection of a literary work" (p. 278).

The conclusion of this brief critique of Irwin's study of Ezekiel has been stated by him with becoming candor, "the results attained are open to question . . . no critical result is ever 'proven' " (p. 283). The "inductive" method employed by Irwin is not basically new. Before him, every biblical critic, no matter how limited in intelligence, has known that "his final judgment . . . must depend on his familiarity with details of thought and expression of the author under study" (p. 278). And the final "results" of Irwin are indeed "open to question." Aside from chapters 40-48, which he regards as spurious *in toto,* he has found that "rather less than twenty-five per cent" of the remainder is from the Prophet Ezekiel, or 251 verses more or less genuine out of a total of 1,273 (p. 283). Whoever reads this genuine "work of Ezekiel" on pages 307-321 will conclude that the numerous *commentators* of this disjointed and miscellaneous series of oracles contributed some of the most vivid, important, and influential parts of the book as we now have it; as Irwin is forced to admit, " 'spurious' and 'worthless' are not equivalent

terms" (p. 334). The reviewer has however discovered no compelling evidence in Irwin's argument for adopting his conclusions. To cite but one example, he cannot believe that chapter 8, containing a vivid and detailed description of the pagan mysteries practiced in the Temple at Jerusalem (on which cf. Th. H. Gaster in *Journal of Biblical Literature*, LX [1941], 289-310, ignored by Irwin), is all spurious after the first verse. To say that "if this chapter be accepted as genuine, then there exists no dependable criteria by which to discriminate in this book between genuine and spurious" (p. 238) looks like begging the question rather than using the inductive method. In spite of his inability to accept Irwin's views on Ezekiel, the reviewer has noted a number of valuable observations and interesting details in his book, which he commends to the attention of Old Testament scholars.

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The Anti-Anthropomorphisms of the Greek Pentateuch. By CHARLES T. FRITSCH. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943. x+81 pp. $2.00.

This is a book which deals with an interesting and important subject, shows competence and intelligence, and yet is disappointing, because its author has been ill advised in method and, in addition, has failed to formulate the problems clearly.

He tells us in his Introduction that

> Ever since the beginning of the scientific investigation of the Greek Old Testament, scholars have noted that the translators sought to remove or moderate many of the human qualities and emotions attributed to God in the Hebrew Old Testament. Yet no one has assembled the examples, let alone classify them, for special study. It has been our purpose in this work to gather these instances from the Greek Pentateuch, to classify them in an orderly manner, and then to make comments on this material and draw definite conclusions (p. 3).

He proceeds to define the two senses in which he uses the word anthropomorphism, the first in the narrow sense of human form, the second in the sense of any human attribute, action or feeling or thought which when connected with God might "lower his dignity or degrade his honor

or character." In the first sense, it may be added, Fritsch includes anthropopathism.

Fulfilling his promise to classify these anti-anthropomorphisms in an orderly manner, he deals with representative passages under the following heads: (1) Anti-Anthropomorphisms, (2) Anti-Anthropopathies, (3) The Name of God Changed or Omitted, (4) Motion and Place Denied God, (5) Direct and Indirect Softening, (6) Grammatical Changes, (7) Intermediary Elements, (8) Miscellaneous Matters.

The author's conscientious study of all these passages leads to the conclusion that

> for the most part, the LXX reveals no consistent method of avoiding the anthropomorphisms of the Hebrew. Genesis and Leviticus, for instance, are singularly free from anti-anthropomorphisms in the Greek, whereas Exodus has the most examples of any book in the Pentateuch. Comparatively speaking, the poetical passages contain more examples of this anti-anthropomorphic tendency than the prose sections. There are even some cases where the LXX is more anthropomorphic than the Hebrew (pp. 62-65).

He continues,

> The tendency to spiritualize the conception of God in the LXX by avoiding anthropomorphic expressions was active; it was not strong enough, however, to make itself felt consistently, except in a comparatively few instances. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the Seventy did not undertake to rewrite the Pentateuch. They were translators, but in various passages their theology is brought out in this version (p. 62).

With this section of the Conclusion the reviewer has no great fault to find, except to question the use of the world "consistently" in connection with the "comparatively few instances" where the anti-anthropomorphic tendencies made themselves felt. The author does not make clear whether he means that a certain Hebrew anthropomorphism is consistently avoided in the LXX, or whether all the instances of avoidance of anthropomorphism taken together are comparatively few. If the latter is true, the author might have done well to try to determine what system the Seventy followed if any. In the preceding paragraph he contents himself with observing that the Seventy "seemed to have followed a definite system in these cases." But what system? Here one might have expected some discussion of the theories of Frankel, who is elsewhere cited by the author, and more especially of the article by P. Churgin on "The Targum and the Septuagint," *Amer. Jour. Sem. Lang.* L (1933-34), 41-65, which the author does not mention at all.

But more serious, in the reviewer's opinion, is the defect of method revealed in the latter part of the Conclusion, which reads as follows:

> Finally, consideration must be given to the possible origin of this anti-anthropomorphic tendency. As has already been stated, there are two schools of thought on this matter. A few scholars like Frankel, Freudenthal and Wendland hold that this tendency is inherent in Judaism itself, whereas a larger number of scholars maintain that it is due to Greek influence. From this study certain observations point definitely to the latter opinion. The emphasis the LXX puts upon the mind (διάνοια) in comparison with the Hebrew's emphasis upon the heart *(lēb)* is not a change wrought by Jewish theologians but it is a distinct Grecism (p. 63).

Here there seem to be two fundamental errors. To take the second first, Fritsch errs in connecting the rendering of Hebrew *lēb* "heart" by διάνοια with any anti-anthropomorphic tendency or theological tendency *überhaupt*. Since idiomatic Hebrew uses "heart" in the sense of "mind," "purpose," and the like, how else could the LXX render it whether it referred to man or God? How else could any Jew have rendered it if he found it in a letter or secular document? Freudenthal has clearly shown that even philosophical terms in the LXX such as ψυχή, νοῦς, φρόνησις, etc. have no such technical meaning as they have in pagan Greek.

In the second place, the author is hardly entitled to decide that the anti-anthropomorphic tendency of the LXX is due to Greek rather than Jewish influence, in view of his failure to make systematic use of a control, such as the Targum of Onkelos, which he barely mentions in passing. If one examines the various types of exegetical paraphrase cited by the author, one finds that they are not peculiar to the LXX but are also found in the Targum, a contemporary translation showing much the same general tendencies as the LXX. A few examples will illustrate this point. The first five verses chosen by the author (pp. 9-11) as representative anti-anthropomorphisms are the following:

Exod. 15:3 Heb.: YHWH *'îš milḥāmāh*, "YHWH is a man of war."
LXX: Κυριος συντριβων πολεμους, "Lord crushing wars."
Targum: *YHWH niṣḥān (naṣḥān?) qᵉrābayya*, "YHWH victorious in wars."

Num. 23: 19 Heb.: *lô 'îš 'Ēl*, "God is not (a) man."
LXX: ουχ ως ανθρωπος ο θεος, "God is not like man."
Targum: *lô kᵉmillê bᵉnê nāšā mêmar ᵉlāhā*, "not like the words of men is the Memra of God."

Num. 12:8 Heb.: *ut^{e}mûnat YHWH yabbît,* "and the form of YHWH he will see."
LXX: και την δοξαν Κυριου ειδεν, "and the glory of the Lord he saw."
Targum: *ud^{e}mût y^{e} qārâ d^{e}YHWH mistakkēl,* "and the form of the glory of YHWH he sees."

Exod. 32:11 Heb.: *way^{e}ḥal Mōšé et-p^{e}nê YHWH ^{e}lôhaw,* "and Moses softened the face of (i.e., "appeased) YHWH his God."
LXX: και εδεηθη Μωυσης εναντι Κ. τ. θεου, "and Moses made supplication before the Lord God."
Targum: *weṣallî Mōšê q^{e}dām YHWH ^{e}laheh,* "and Moses prayed before YHWH his God."

Exod. 33:14 Heb.: *panay yēl^{e}kû,* "my face shall go."
LXX: αυτος προπορευσομαι, "I myself will go before."
Targum *š^{e}kintî t^{e}hak,* "my Shekinah will go."

In all these passages we find the same exegetical periphrasis in the Targum as in the LXX. Why, then, should we ascribe the tendency to Greek rather than Jewish influence? The same doubts about the author's conclusion occur in connections with many other passages which the reviewer selected at random for checking with the Targum, for example, Gen. 22:2 (p. 25), the "tent of testimony" (p. 31), Exod. 20:3 (p. 40). The reviewer is also puzzled by Fritsch's argument on pages 22-23 that, in the theophany of Exod. 3:14, "the rendering of Hebrew *'ehyeh* by ὁ ὤν introduces a philosophic coloring entirely foreign to the Hebrew mind . . . the participial form is clearly less personal than the finite verb of the Hebrew." In what way is the third person less personal than the first person, or the participle than the imperfect? If the Greek is more philosophical than the Hebrew here, it is only in so far as it fails to convey the feeling that *'ehyeh* is a personal name as the Targum does. But for Jewish readers in Palestine, *'ehyeh* here meant the eternally existing god just as clearly as ὁ ὤν meant it for Jewish readers in Egypt.

There are other debatable points in the book and some slips, for example, the rendering of διεφώνησε "perished" as "uttered a dissenting voice" (p. 14). The chief fault, we may repeat, lies in the author's failure to fix the range and limits of the LXX's anti-anthropomorphic tendency by making use of the Targum as a check. Taking the book as it stands, it must be considered a careful and useful piece of work.

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From Jesus to Paul. By JOSEPH KLAUSNER. Translated from the Hebrew by WILLIAM F. STINESPRING. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943. xvi + 624 pp. $3.50.

The English translation of Professor Klausner's *Jesus of Nazareth,* made by Canon (now Professor) Herbert Danby, was published in 1925 and is known to all English-speaking students of the New Testament. Many of them are familiar with his *Messianischen Vorstellungen des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten* (Berlin, 1904), a work which ought to have been translated into English long ago. His other important writings are in Hebrew and consequently inaccessible to the large majority of biblical students outside Jewish circles. It is one of these which Professor Stinespring of Duke University has translated in the present volume.

The book has had a tragic history, having been written twice—like Carlyle's *French Revolution.* The author began collecting notes for the work as far back as 1907; in 1929 his accumulation of materials was either stolen or destroyed during the anti-Jewish riots in Jerusalem, when his house in Talpioth was looted, his books taken, his manuscripts torn and scattered. After two months Dr. Klausner was able to return to his devastated house; a few of his manuscripts were found in the garden, but the envelope containing the materials for this book was never found. It took another five years to reassemble the materials, and five more to write out the book in manuscript.

The main purpose of this volume is to account for Paul and the rise of Gentile Christianity. It sets before the reader two great questions: "How was Christianity separated from Judaism, and why did Judaism not accept the teaching of Paul as it likewise did not accept the teaching of Jesus?" (p. xi). The major answer to both questions is that Paul arose in the Jewish Diaspora, whose faith and practice were not so pure as those of Palestinian Jewry; and it was the Diaspora, with its contaminations and compromises with paganism, which became the main source of Gentile Christianity. Here the ceremonial laws were less carefully observed than in Palestine; here strict monotheism had already been watered-down with Hellenistic religious ideas; here crowds of "God-fearers" had attached themselves to the synagogue, without going the full length of becoming proselytes; here women, particularly, were devotees of Judaism, drawn by its high ethics, its pure and ancient religious ideas, and their way made easy by its acceptance

of baptism as the seal of initiation; Gentile men were repelled by the more severe requirement of circumcision as well as of baptism—the idea is repeated again and again in the book. When Christianity came along, especially as presented by Paul, these God-fearers (chiefly women) flocked over to the church. Such was the beginning and early course of Gentile Christianity.

As might be expected, the book is a welcome relief from purely "edifying" books on Paul, written not to appraise or to understand him historically, but to strain honey from his every word and from every incident in his life, and to represent him as, personally, a master saint and his thought the foundation of orthodox theology. This book does not belong among the Panegyrics of the Saints! And it is good to see Paul, now and then, through other than Christian eyes. It helps us to see better what the man really was, to study him in the shade, and out of the glare of rhetorical acclamation. He was not perfect; he had his faults—though we may not be prepared to view him as the complete opportunist Klausner describes. The *advocatus diaboli* has his function, in historical studies.

But it is a question whether Klausner appraises him altogether fairly. There are pages which read more like a historical novel than a product of research (e.g., p. 331). One would scarcely guess, from some chapters, that the book was an account of the rise of a new religion: it misses the depth and the distinctive quality of Christianity at its New Testament best, somewhat as Christian writers have often missed the characteristic best in ancient Judaism, the mother religion. Indeed, one has the feeling that Klausner is too busily engaged in drawing up a brief against Paul, like a clever lawyer, to see the other side. There is too much argument, too much disputation; there are too many hypotheses; and there is too much skepticism and questioning of motives. Indeed, Judaism itself was surely something nobler and greater, as seen in its best first-century representatives, than it appears here as the foil against which Paul and Gentile Christianity are set. In some respects, the book may be viewed as a Zionist critique of Paul. The Apostle has always been a puzzle to Jews: how could a man be so thoroughly Jewish and at the same time so thoroughly un-Jewish? And how could a loyal Pharisee, one who had sat at the feet of Rabban Gamaliel, ever bring himself to reject not only the Oral Law but the Written Torah as well? He has been a puzzle to Christians too—and we do not

claim that he or the principles of his teaching have ever been fully understood by the majority of Christians, Catholic or Protestant. But polemic gets little farther than apologetic in analyzing so complex a personality as the great Apostle to Gentiles. After all, we have only a handful of his letters to go by; the biographical element in the Book of Acts is clearly secondary, and much later, and not at all certainly by a "Paulinist" as Klausner holds. There are vast lacunae in our information about the early church, lacunae to be filled-in only by the most careful hypothesis. And the fresh patch of hypothesis must fairly match, not contrast with, the surviving fabric. In particular, there are two areas of which we know little, but which were undoubtedly of great importance: the varieties of thought and practice within Judaism, especially in the Diaspora, before the Fall of Jerusalem, and early Gentile Christianity before Paul (and contemporaneous with Paul). The evidence for the former was almost completely obliterated in the process of retrenchment, unification, canonization, and solidification which took place after the crushing of the revolt in 66-70, and again after 135 —a process well outlined in chapters VII and VIII of the first book of George Foot Moore's *Judaism*. The evidence for the latter is equally scanty, but quite as important in accounting for the rise of Christianity, as Bousset's *Kyrios Christos* and other modern works make increasingly certain. Without more attention to these areas, and more careful reconstruction, reading back for the most part from later evidence and reading between the lines of such documents as we possess, we shall hardly make much further progress in understanding either St. Paul or the rise of Catholic, i.e., Gentile, Christianity. It is true that Klausner recognizes the importance of Diaspora Judaism, but his refusal to admit the existence of Jewish Syncretism or Gnosticism rules out any particular significance it might have for Paul's theology; as for pre-Pauline Gentile Christianity, in which modern New Testament scholarship is greatly interested, it might as well not have existed as far as Klausner is concerned. His New Testament studies are at least two decades out of date.

Certain minor points need to be noted. The book does not take adequate account of modern New Testament criticism, especially in English; its source-analysis is inadequate, and does not go much beyond that of the opening years of this century. There are passages which are simply out of focus. Did Jesus use the term, "Days of the Messiah"? It

seems to be a later rabbinic term; even "Messiah" may not have been common in the first century. So, also, the technical term, "birth-pangs of the Messiah": is there evidence that it was used in the first century? And what real evidence is there that Herod was thought to be the Messiah (p. 145), or that the "fear of spirits" accounts for Paul's Christology (p. 470)? The book is like an album of pictures, many of which are not quite properly posed, lighted, or focussed, or where the shutter was not fast enough to seize the essential features and leave out the unimportant.

But the book has a value, nevertheless. It draws attention to the importance of Diaspora Judaism in the first century (Bk. I), and gives many details of importance for students of Paul and of early Christianity. The account of the pagan world in Book II and of Hellenistic Jewish thought in Book III is useful, and many readers will no doubt discover for the first time the importance and relevance of these areas of philosophical and religious thought for the understanding of Paul and the early church. These introductory chapters are written by a master hand. But the rest of the book needs revision; the Book of Acts is not a primary source, and the account of the early church in Palestine is really a collection of later traditions, some of them quite thoroughly legendary. Above all, the picture of Paul in Books VI and VII needs, not retouching, but restudy and repainting. It needs something more than impatience with the ceremonial law and the exploitation of a clever, compromising scheme for winning Gentile converts, to account for Paul of Tarsus.

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The Devil and the Jews. The Medieval Conception of the Jew and Its Relation to Modern Antisemitism. By JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. xiv + 279 pp. $3.50.

In Dr. Salo Baron's *Bibliography of Jewish Social Studies* for the years 1938-39, there are recorded some 150 publications of an anti-Semitic nature, and about 50 further publications of apologetics and defense of Jewish rights. Paper limitations notwithstanding, the ensuing

years have seen no diminution in the quantity of writing on both sides of the socalled "Jewish question." Attack and defense have penetrated every field of thought; every period of history has been canvassed for material to justify the anti-Semites or the Jews, to explain anti-Semitism to the Jews or the Jews to potential or actual anti-Semites. If ever a topic could be said to have been thoroughly analyzed and investigated, this is it. And yet—with all the prodigious labor expended by Jewish apologists, there are still anti-Semites, but with all the prodigious labor expended by anti-Semites there are still Jews.

Twenty years ago, Rabbi Joel Blau said that it actually appears "as if anti-Semitism were an International Benevolent Society for the Preservation of Semitism." There is unquestionably a profound truth in this; any group will unite, will write off specific differences among its members in opposition to aggression, with its threat of total disintegration. The difficulty is that anti-Semitism is strengthened by the existence of Jews as much as, if not more than, the Jewish community is strengthened by anti-Semitism. It is said that when Hitler's racist policy was not getting across in some of the smaller German communities, his henchmen in those communities wired headquarters to send them some Jews. I doubt very much whether Rabbi Blau would have found it necessary, in any community in the world where there are Jews, to wire headquarters to send over some anti-Semites.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of anti-Semitism is not its organized aspect. Organizations exist in time; they are born, flourish, and die. They exist in space; they cannot readily be transplanted, as those will attest who have tried to graft German anti-Semitism on to American life. There is, however, another anti-Semitism which is far more pervasive and far more dangerous than the anti-Semitism of organizations. This is the casual and unthinking anti-Semitism of the "man in the street." The Germans had a folk-jest, consisting of characterizations of other European peoples—"One Frenchman is a chef; two Frenchmen is a liaison; three Frenchmen is a married couple." One section of this jest went "One Austrian is a soldier; two Austrians is a Turn Verein; three Austrians is absolutely impossible—the third is a Polish Jew." Many of those who applauded this jest were not conscious anti-Semites; "some of their best friends were Jews"; but deeply ingrained in them was a something which made the point—the pervasiveness of the Jew in European society—a very telling one. So, too, with the casually unpleasant

Jew, or character with a Jewish name, in practically every recent English novel and a great many American novels—the authors did not include them in deliberate malice, but rather as an unthinking yielding to an unconscious prejudice.

The distinction of Dr. Trachtenberg's book is that it probes into this unconscious prejudice and attempts to discover at least some of its historic roots. It is the work of a thoughtful scholar, whose intention is to understand, rather than that of an apologist, whose purpose is to refute:

> The problem that is treated here has become one of increasing importance to the peace of the world. To elucidate its background is to render it the better understood, and thus perhaps to move it a step nearer solution. I am under no illusion as to the immediate practical utility of such an investigation. But at least for the record, and for those who cherish truth above fancy, the story is here (p. xi).

Trachtenberg's earlier book, *Jewish Magic and Superstition* (New York, 1939), was a careful study of the actual extent of magical and superstitious practices among the medieval Jews. His new book complements this by detailing the types and degrees of magical practice of which the Jews were suspected by their Christian contemporaries. This material is brought forward to amplify the suggestion, made first in the earlier book and now repeated, that the essential element in popular anti-Semitism, today as in the Middle Ages, is the belief that the Jew is in close association with the devil.

His Satanic Majesty is not a prominent figure in the Jewish religion; in medieval Christianity, however, which was the heir not only of Judaism but also of the bipolar mystery cults of the Hellenistic Near East, Satan assumed a central role as archopponent of Jesus in the moral realm, as the force working for the damnation of men much as Jesus worked for their salvation. As the Antichrist, Satan's votaries were defrocked priests; his ritual, the Black Mass, in which the words of the Christian Mass were recited backwards.

The Jews, too, were archopponents of Jesus, not, it is true, in the moral realm, but in the theological. The popular mind of the Middle Ages could not, however, make this distinction between realms. Jesus was the Christ; opposition to him was opposition, whether it was to his morality or to his deification. The devil and the Jews were working toward the same end; they were, therefore, in league with one another. Thus there

arose the legend of the "demonic" Jew, and thus there developed the hatred of the Jew which left its mark on the art and literature of the Middle Ages, and its residuary scar on the political and social life of our own times.

> The most vivid impression to be gained from a reading of medieval allusions to the Jew is of a hatred so vast and abysmal, so intense, that it leaves one gasping for comprehension. The unending piling up of vile epithets and accusations and curses, the consistent representation of the Jew as the epitome of everything evil and abominable, for whom in particular the unbounded scorn and contumely of the Christian world were reserved, must convince the most casual student that we are dealing here with a fanaticism altogether subjective and nonrational (p. 12).

To this view of the Jews as forming with the devil a universal fellowship of opposition to Jesus must be added the widespread belief in the stubbornness of the Jews. It was generally felt that the force of the Christian interpretation of the Scriptures was so strong that no variant interpretation could legitimately be held. The mission and martyrdom of Jesus were foretold in the Hebrew Scriptures; of this there could be no question. When, therefore, the Jews denied Jesus, they were obstinately refusing to accept the only possible sense of their own holy books. Worse still, this stubborn refusal put the Jews in the position of heretics, who had rejected the true religion, rather than in that of infidels, who did not know of the true religion. One might pity an infidel and labor for his conversion; for a heretic there could be no feeling save scorn and hatred.

Finally, to complete the picture of which two phases are the "demonic" and the "heretic" Jew, Trachtenberg presents the medieval conception of the Jew as sorcerer. This was not so much a recognition of the Jew's own forms of magic and superstition (as the author proved in his earlier book) as it was a transfer of responsibility to the Jew for prevalent Christian magical beliefs and practices. It is, in fact, a reflection of the belief in an alliance between the Jews and Satan who "was the ultimate source of magic, which operated only by his diabolic will and connivance. Indeed, magic was the technique whereby Satan promoted the designs of those evil humans who fought with him to overthrow and destroy Christendom" (p. 60). The actual magical practices attributed to the Jew were few; the legend far outdid the reality.

Out of these three elements a world of medieval and modern anti-Semitism has developed. Other "scientific" interpretations may contain a modicum of truth. They are, however, too rational to account for anti-Semitism, for what reason has created, better reason can destroy; and better reasons have been found against every canard of the scientific anti-Semites than any they ever produced. To answer each specific charge is to deal with the symptoms rather than with the disease.

If anti-Semitism is, as Trachtenberg with much justification sees it, a deep-seated prejudice of the Christian world, there is no nostrum, no panacea for its cure. Only a long and tedious educational program carried out honestly and painstakingly by every Christian clergyman of every Christian denomination over many generations could eliminate anti-Semitism. Those who believe that the solution lies in the assimilation of the Jew to the culture around him are on the wrong track. The problem cannot be solved by making the Jews less Jewish; it can only be solved by making the Christians more Christian.

Dr. Trachtenberg has much reason to feel the practical inutility of his book. Despite his excellent scholarship and his deep understanding of the problem, despite the beautiful dress in which the Yale University Press has presented his work to the world, the world is not yet ready to attempt radical surgery on one of its most cherished prejudices.

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The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. By PAUL OSKAR KRISTELLER. Translated into English by VIRGINIA CONANT. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. xiv + 441 pp. $4.50.

The fortunes of this book will illustrate at once the catastrophe which has overtaken humanistic scholarship in our time and the occasional happy instances in which something has been salvaged from the debris. Dr. Kristeller commenced this work in Germany in 1931. The manuscript was not completed until 1937 and, by that time, its publication in Germany had become impossible. The author took refuge in Italy where, in that very year, he brought out two volumes of hitherto inedited works of Ficino under the title *Supplementum Ficinianum,* with discussion and notes in Latin. The work on the philosophy of Ficino

was delayed by reason of the necessity of translating the text from German to Italian. The year following, in 1938, the task had been discharged and the work accepted for publication when "the terror that walketh at noonday" caught up with the author again and he was forced to make another migration to the United States. Here, for the second time, the work was translated into another tongue and, due to the skill of Miss Conant, now appears with no vestigial remnants of its linguistic metamorphoses.

The book is a sheer delight because of its mature competence. So many monographs on particular figures suffer because the author knows no more than his one man and is in a position to offer little beyond a pedestrian digest of the works of his subject. Kristeller, however, knows the history of philosophy and all along the line is able to inform the reader at what points Ficino is voicing attitudes characteristic of the medieval in contrast to those of the classical or modern periods. The sources are constantly distinguished; this is from Aristotle, this from Plato, this from Plotinus, or some one else. We are shown how completely various ingredients are built into a single structure, what elements from the sources have been rejected and what may have been retained despite incongruity. The conclusion of the whole study is that the first systematic philosopher of the Renaissance was a Christian apologist concerned to establish "the inner congruence and harmony" between philosophy and religion and deprecating that separation of faith and knowledge "whereby religion was profaned by ignorance and philosophy by impiety."

Such a summary is eminently interesting in view of the popular opinion that the philosophy of the Renaissance was inimical to the Christian tradition. On the basis of Kristeller's exposition, one can be even more precise and say that Ficino was attempting to stem the rift between religion and philosophy, between faith and reason, prevalent in his day among the Averroists and the Occamists. His method was not that of the Council of Trent with its return to St. Thomas and Aristotle, but rather that of a return to the pre-Thomistic Augustinianism already markedly affected by the neo-Platonic tradition, which was re-enforced in the hands of Ficino by a direct revival of the sources.

A few specific examples will serve to illustrate the manner in which Kristeller traces Ficino's appropriation and manipulation of his sources. With regard to the hierarchy of being, "Plotinus' hierarchy is a series of

strata superimposed one above another. The hierarchy of the Middle Ages, on the other hand, is a series of degrees disposed one beside the other. In Ficino we find both the Plotinian and the medieval hierarchy of Being." In Plotinus' scheme of the grades of Being there are six substances, in Ficino's only five, because he sought to make the soul the median in a perfectly symmetrical system with two on each side. The doctrine of the *primum in aliquo genere* is peculiar to Ficino. The point of departure was the distinction made by Plotinus between fire and warmth, the former being the primary causative. Pursuing this line, Ficino held that there is in each species a *primum* from which the quality of the species is derived. The terminology was suggested by the phrase of Aquinas, *perfectum in aliquo genere*. Ficino was able to use this concept for the demonstration of God.

The Aristotelian doctrine of movement was developed by Ficino into a general ontological doctrine and merged with the neo-Platonic theory of universal desire into a systematic unity.

Ficino is the inventor of *Platonic love*. By it he meant something more than the insipid attachment now popularly associated with the phrase. His love was a synthesis of the Greek *eros* and the Christian *agape*. The end of *eros* is union with God, and since God is the God who so loved the world, the God of *agape*, the love whose end is self-fulfillment, passes into the love which is capable of self-effacement. "Therefore," says Ficino, "such minds are moved by an ineffable ardor and sweetness of love toward God and each other while they return themselves spontaneously to Him as to their father and give themselves most willingly to each other as to their brothers." This whole concept of love pervaded the Academy. For the first time, a school was built around not merely the pursuit of a common idea but also the bond of intimate friendship between the members.

The defense of immortality lies, of course, in the Platonic tradition. In the hands of Ficino it receives an amplification peculiar to himself which Kristeller denominates the "appetite argument." The premise is that no appetite has been implanted by God in man for which there is no gratification, but the appetite of the soul is for God, and this appetite is incapable of continuous and perfect fulfillment in the present life. Hence the survival of the soul after death is necessary.

If this significant book has a limitation, it is one which arises from the

initial delimitation of the task. The book is entitled, *The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino*. One who approaches it from the standpoint of religious ideas cannot repress a measure of regret that the subject did not include theology. But this is only a further argument for the immortality of the soul, which needs another life for the gratification of the *appetitus theologicus*.

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Melville's Religious Thought: An Essay in Interpretation. By WILLIAM BRASWELL. Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1943, 154 pp. $3.00.

Seventy-five or even twenty-five years ago few persons took Herman Melville's thought seriously. The rather amusing vicissitudes in his reputation show that it has passed through four marked stages. If during his own lifetime he was not profoundly appraised, neither was he on the whole neglected or misinterpreted. His initial reception was gray rather than dazzling or dark. Thereafter, for over a generation, he descended almost to obscurity; his stories were seldom read and very rarely regarded as of any weight. The first revival of his fame came with the vogue of popular and sensational South Sea romances over twenty years ago. At that time he was commonly regarded as a writer of adventure stories, and one whose unfortunate inclination to thought had marred several of his books and ultimately ruined his literary career. Within more recent years, however, an increasing number of books and articles entitle us to speak of a second renaissance in his reputation. We no longer deplore the symbolism in *Moby-Dick*. Now we have come not only to respect his art more fully, but to scrutinize his thinking more carefully and systematically. It has been found that he has more to say to us under several more or less widely separated heads than formerly supposed. Willard Thorp and others have called attention to his reactions to social and economic problems. William Braswell is one of a number of writers who have examined his no less vigorous though more perplexing ideas in romantic metaphysics, romantic pessimism, and religious unrest. Although Melville's vague and eclectic thinking has sometimes held the attraction of a mere riddle, his highly poetic expression bears witness to the conjunction of a sincere spirit and a trenchant mind.

The present volume is the best thus far to appear dealing with Melville as a religious and metaphysical thinker. A considerable mass of observation is contracted within relatively few pages. The treatment remains in general chronological, with careful effort to ascertain Melville's own thoughts as distinct from the utterances of his fictional characters. The first chapter deals with his surprisingly wide and well chosen reading in religion and philosophy. Melville's views of the Christian missionaries, as recorded in *Typee* and *Omoo,* are—very properly in such a book—sketched rapidly. Some distinct contributions are made in the chapters dealing with *Mardi* and *Pierre,* where the novelist's allegorically expressed views of mind and matter receive enlightening commentary. The discovery, which Braswell shares with Merton M. Sealts, that Melville created characters representing the vegetal, sensible, rational, and spiritual souls, based on discussions and references in Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy,* goes a long way to clarifying *Mardi,* and at least assists in our understanding of *Pierre.* The chapter on *Moby-Dick,* though less original, affords a good summary of the highly miscellaneous ideas in Melville's greatest story. With more of sweet reasonableness than marked originality, the study concludes with brief summaries of the posthumously published works, *Billy Budd* and *Daniel Orme.*

While the seven chapters into which Braswell's book is divided seem rather too much like separate essays than steps in a single argument, they do give an interesting picture of Melville's development, more penetrating and succinctly vigorous than any published hitherto. The criticism, though not fundamentally new, is human and discerning. We see that when the novelist wrote *Typee* and *Omoo* his serenity was under attack, but still relatively unbroken. The complete outline of his tragedy is foreshadowed in the meditative *Mardi,* although the mood remains a twilight before a storm. The force of the tempest inspires and ennobles *Moby-Dick.* Doubts, torments, and self-dissentions make *Pierre* a painful record of Melville's most harrowing experiences. Although *The Confidence Man* is, perhaps, more pessimistic and wanting in confidence in human nobility, it proves, at least, much less moving. The later writings are, by comparison, relatively calm. Such, we are convincingly told, was the fabric of Melville's spiritual life. It is only to be regretted that Braswell fails to draw the threads more closely together. Nevertheless, his profusion of somewhat miscellaneous references shows

more clearly than ever before the power and scope of Melville's mind. He was astonishingly familiar with the chief authors on both the skeptical and the believing sides. Happily for both his art and his intelligence, his reading lay rather in the major classics from Athens to the French Revolution than in pedestrian and parochial disputants immediately surrounding him. In short, he stood closer to the Church Fathers and their heretical antagonists, to Dante and Shakespeare, to Shaftsbury and Hume, than to the popular standard-bearers of 1850. Braswell clearly shows, although he nowhere asserts, how far Melville as a thinker rose above most of his contemporaries, and how just is his claim to the station once absurdly denied his works, a high place among the more thoughtful American classics.

Helpful as Braswell's book is, it has several limitations. Although favored by penetration, by persistent attention to its material, and by a commendable scholarship extending to research in marginalia, the study is conducted with a certain timidity and lack of breadth. The author too often forgets that to Melville, the poet and allegorical novelist, ideas grew out of experiences with people as well as with books. He unwisely slights much of Melville's writing and still more of his world. Melville's ideas are not a system or even the part of a system; they are part of a man. Braswell relies too much on Melville's statements; he too seldom weighs the provocation of these statements. And since Melville was pre-eminently a poetic thinker, his statements should always, therefore, be understood and interpreted in relation to their human context.

Melville's social and ethical convictions were more important in forming his views of God and of "the meaning of life" than Braswell leads us to suppose. *White Jacket* and *Redburn* are as much social propaganda as *An Enemy of the People* or *The Doll's House.* The fiery core of *Typee* and *Omoo* consists in sociological protest. Behind the blasphemous moods and ideas found in *Moby-Dick, Pierre,* and *The Confidence Man* stands the potential reformer, with his idealistic ethics. Far more than with most of the transcendentalists, religion for Melville had this ethical inspiration. From the disturbing evidence afforded by the happy heathen islanders and their disintegration under their hypocritical Christian conquerors, from the terrifying witness of the slums of Liverpool and the Irish emigrant ship, and from his merciless anatomy

of the motives and morals of conventional society, he fanned the flame of indignation sublimated in the wrath of Ahab. By relatively slighting the social aspects of Melville's thought and experience, Braswell, accordingly, gives a somewhat faded picture of Melville's theological and philosophical ideas. Similarly, his tendency to describe *Pierre* as though it were a treatise and not a novel leads him to overlook certain of the familiar romantic elements in the drawing of the two symbolical maidens, Lucy and Isabel, although no account of any aspect of these characters is really adequate without such attention. Thus he gives us the skeleton of Melville's ideas without their full vitality. Isabel apparently represents the extreme pseudo-oriental form of transcendentalism with which Pierre bravely but somewhat misguidedly experiments. The self-imposed limitations of the critic also cause him to stress Melville's sources at the expense of his position as a prophet. *Pierre,* written in 1852, is a remarkably Ibsenesque work. Braswell is generally satisfied to define Melville's meaning without concern for what this meaning may have signified or may still signify in the world of thought.

As a final limitation in this generally able study may be mentioned the distinctly weak and abbreviated discussion of *Clarel,* confined to half a dozen pages. That this ambitious book has been unwarrentably slighted by others, or that one would, perhaps, prefer to read prose rather than verse, hardly justifies such neglect. Its mere bulk, in addition to its poetical style, has often discouraged Melville's critics. Whatever may have been said or left unsaid about *Clarel* by impatient critics, the poem, as K. H. Sundermann in his dissertation published in Germany has recognized, contains much the most explicit, subtle, and comprehensive statements ever made by Melville on ethical and religious themes. Although it undeniably lacks the force and passion of *Moby-Dick,* it witnesses an intellectual growth rather than a decline. Further examination of this poem remains one of the next major tasks for scholars in American thought and literature. With Melville's substantial worth now much more firmly established than ten or twenty years ago and his habits of mind better understood, there is no justification for students of his ideas to slight the book in which these ideas are most delicately and yet most convincingly developed.

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Towards Belief in God. By HERBERT H. FARMER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1943. 252 pp. $2.00.

This is a meaty and suggestive little book by one of the best-furnished of our contemporary theologians. In it, Farmer is plowing new furrows in a field which has been tilled from time immemorial. Men have believed and do believe in God, and the fruits of this belief are so pervasive and important that the belief itself requires an accounting. But, as Farmer observes, this is an endless task which must be repeated for each new link in the continuity of human experience, since belief in God is not merely assent to the *idea* of God but an active personal response to the *fact* of God. Thus, each succeeding generation of living men must examine afresh the faith that is in them or in their fellows; history and logic are never more than ancillary aids to the prime business of personal experience and decisions. If there is an objective, meaningful relationship between God and man, it must be a personal one, an "I-Thou" experience which can never be reduced to finality, either in a faith once for all delivered to the saints or in a formula once for all delivered to the scientists or the metaphysicians. The term God does "not designate merely an abstract idea or theorethical hypothesis." Here it always refers to God as "a living personal will" (p. ix). Knowledge of Him, therefore, necessarily involves personal commerce with Him.

In the exploration and defense of this thesis, Farmer first undertakes a brief summary of "the elements of conviction" which go to make up his general theory of knowledge. "If a belief (1) shines in its own light with a certain inherent compellingness, (2) 'works' in the practical task of managing our world, (3) reveals on examination both internal consistencies and external harmony with other experience and knowledge, then we have in regard to it as full an assurance of truth as it is possible for a human mind to have and as it ought ever to ask" (p. 28).

God's existence is indemonstrable; Farmer accepts Kant's negative critique of the classic "arguments." He thinks, however, that this does not really touch the problem of religious faith, since that does not proceed from an awareness of God's existence to a personal communion with him but rather in the reverse order. In so doing, Farmer seems to weaken his case or, at least, to concede too much to the skeptic. Like most Protestant theologians, Farmer makes divine revelation and human response prior and primary and comes close to relegating reason to the

role of rationalization. But unlike Protestant orthodoxy, he is apparently interested in a *summa contra gentiles.* But this requires that reason be allowed its proper place as pedagogue to faith. It is a sound caution which avoids excessive claims for the "arguments" concerning God's existence and nature; Anselm's *Proslogion* goes too far. On the other hand, given the skeptical bias of the modern temper, one ought not to underrate the resources of "natural theology" to build up a consilience of argument; inference and analogy brings the mind to the point of seeking and expecting new light to break and to prepare the human spirit for the divine encounter. Natural theology is the narthex of the temple; beyond it is the sanctuary and high altar. They should not be confused, but their ordering is important.

The coercive element in man's belief in God is "the sense of God as the transcendent other, as absolutely demanding will, as the promise and source of all good." The typical and proper human response is "an impulse towards humble abasement, absolute surrender and obedience, joyful trust and faith" (p. 60).

The pragmatic element in Christian faith roots in the fact that it "works," that it satisfies and ministers to the fundamental and uniquely human needs. It is the universal and tragic case that men fall into disharmonies with themselves, with their moral tasks and duties, with their fellows and their world. In one of the best sections of the book, Farmer shows how "the Christ-style of life" (awkward phrase!) affects vital changes in these mis-relations and recovers for man a new sense of at-homeness in God's world.

It has already been indicated that, for Farmer, the reflective element is not a prerequisite to valid belief, since plain folk are manifestly capable of authentic religious experience without rationalizing it. And, in any case, cogent reflection in this area itself requires a prior personal decision and commitment. The survey and criticism of the objective data of religious experience may furnish little or no motivation to personal faith. Before a man undertakes the role of a Christian theologian, he needs must stand before the Cross of Christ and give an answer. "The Crucifixion of Jesus is either a great, grim, hoarse, derisive shout of *No* to the proposition that God is love . . . or it is a firm, steady, undefeated *Yes.*" It is only thus, from within the perspective of Christian commitment, that we can proceed to the explication of the faith wherein

we stand. Farmer begins by pointing out the massive biases in modern culture which militate against faith. The first is a bias toward relativity, which finds expression in "comparative religion," tentativeness, and the bland equation of all beliefs. The second is a skeptical bias, which derives from the modern obsession with the physical and with the public, measurable data of science. With a critical glance at each, Farmer selects the two major types of theories by means of which religious faith is "explained away" by modern men. On the one hand, there is the sociological theory of religion, represented at its best in Durkheim. This is regarded as "the most plausible and powerfully argued" of the denials of the objective claims of religion. On the other hand, there is the psychological theory of religion, a typical spokesman for which he finds in Leuba. Both these theories are criticized and discounted. The remainder of the book is devoted to an attempt to show that "belief in God . . . helps us to make sense of our experience generally" (p. 181). This is particularly successful in the concluding chapter on the problem of suffering.

Even so bare a précis as this ought to indicate that the book has an immense scope, a consistently high quality of discussion and represents an important theological viewpoint in contemporary Protestantism. This latter is a compound of the classical Protestant stress on the spontaneity of God's dealing with men, the liberal emphasis upon the empirical and pragmatic approach to theology and, finally, a chastened rationalism which looks in the direction, at least, of a natural theology. The result is no ordinary eclecticism, and it preserves much good from each of the sources from which it is derived. The temper of the book (save for an odd lapse on page 178) is devout in the best sense, and, on almost every page, there are epigrams and random insights of real brilliance and depth of perception.

In retrospect, this reviewer finds himself wondering why Farmer touches so lightly a theme dear to orthodox Protestants and evangelical liberals alike: the Christocentric focus of our knowledge of God. Luther, Calvin, and Ritschl were chary of metaphysics, but they countered this with a tremendous accent on Christ as man's sole and sufficient clue to certainty about God. This idea is certainly not absent from Farmer's thought, but it is never made to appear as vivid and essential as his general position would seem to call for. Finally, as a rather trivial aside,

we may note two minor errors: Nicolai Hartmann (pp. 198, 199, 201) apparently never sported a "von"; and the initials of the Henderson cited on page 204 should be L. J., not L. V.

This book has much to commend it; it belongs in the van of current theology. The position here outlined will, we may hope, be filled out to an even more impressive stature. Equally important, it is the kind of thing which will serve the needs of inquiring students and churchmen who want to see the case for a positive and authentic Christian faith put persuasively and well.

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God and Evil. By C. E. M. JOAD. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. 349 pp. $3.00.

All the world knows about C. E. M. Joad, head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of London, and of his gradual conversion to theism and to Christianity, and will, therefore, be interested in his attempt in this book to expose the arguments of his re-consideration of the theistic standpoint. But the reader should be warned in advance not to expect what the title might imply, namely, a discussion of the problem of God's relation to evil under a new aspect. The aim pursued is rather to argue that there is a world of reality, and, therefore, of eternity, which we do not recognize because our human species is too young for the realization of truth. But, "also in our humility," we may maintain that there is a world of values which is other than and outside the world of evolving life. This statement means to Joad the rejection of both materialism and subjectivism. He admits that the knowledge we achieve of that objective world of values is intuitive in character, so that it cannot be demonstrated nor communicated to those who have not shared the experience on which it is based.

This being partly the presuppositions and partly the result of the author's philosophy, he doubtless, can not help discussing the mechanistic and materialistic principles, when he tries philosophically to vindicate his new-gained Christian standpoint. For this purpose he puts aside the personal root of his inner struggles, that "definite need of the heart" which for him is not satisfied by the blind (Brahmanic) as-

sertion that evil is an illusion and the world unreal, but requires "a personal and interested God" who can assist man in his endeavor to overcome real evil. But to assert a personal God, one must make a clean sweep of the fundamental constituents of the mechanistic conception of the universe. For this reason, the author devotes a large portion of his book (chapters 4 to 6) to the question as to what evolution really encompasses. Starting from the definitions of change and development, he asserts that development entails real change, that is, real novelties. He is eager to stress that our evolutionary picture involves turnings within the natural household like the turning from lifeless to living substance, or from matter to mind, and that those changes, far from meaning mere re-arrangements of unchanging substances, do mean the coming into being of new qualities of things from time to time.

Regarded from this point of view, these chapters can be valued as an instructive survey of the arguments modern philosophy is to propose concerning both positive and probable inferences drawn from physical facts, inferences which can help sketch our picture of the universe. The author then proceeds towards the possibility of the experience of God discussed in the most important chapter of the book. He begins with the system of values elaborated in his earlier book, *Philosophy for Our Times,* and goes on to the relevant observation that the considerations which lead man to think a belief true are not the same as the reasons which demonstrate its truth. Therefore he discusses the question, how we are to distinguish between reasoned and rationalized beliefs. However, he will not answer strictly how much of religious experience the aesthetic, musical, and moral experiences include. Suffice it to say that the object touched thereby frequently is "a reality other than and greater than" the person experiencing and his or her surroundings, and that, on the other hand, this specific reality is not simply to be called the universal consciousness. Though this greater reality is God, we are not in a position to call him creator of the evil, nor creator of the world, because "the principle of evil in the universe is probably independent of God and exists in his despite. God, then, is not all-powerful."

It is, however, not this conclusion that arouses in Mr. Joad the discomforting feeling that he is not as yet in full harmony with the Christian faith. What troubles his soul most is the inability to go the whole way with "the Christian belief," in so far as it involves the uniqueness

of the personality of Jesus Christ and the events connected with his birth and death, as well as the uniqueness of the human soul within the universe. And the author is sure that he is typical of many of his generation in respect to these two "Christian claims" that "chiefly stand in the way of my personal acceptance."

His manner of dealing with these difficulties shows him to be misguided by a literature which is in no way responsible for the interpretation of the doctrine of the Church. He seems to have taken his information concerning the content of the Christian faith from writings of Clive Staples Lewis, to whom he refers when he quotes some rather strange "Christian" assertions, such as this one, that "the animals are only for man's benefit," and "that they achieve selfhood only in him" (*sc.*, man). Furthermore, is it not very strange that a Protestant philosopher in the middle of the twentieth century, when trying to describe the content of the Christian faith, quotes the Creed Quicumque (under the name of the Athanasian) as one of his principle sources? This confession of faith originated no earlier than around the year 700, when its expanded form was adopted at a provincial Spanish synod in Toledo. What does the author mean by quoting this creed, which was recommended by Bishop Hincmar of Rheims quite unofficially to his diocesans as late as 852? Between the lines we read Mr. Joad's reply to this question: "Why are we not told?" Similarly he feels duped by responsible authorities as regards the doctrine about the eternal punishment in hell, "that is not torment as pictured in the old view." In general he complains: "If these are the things that most Christians believe, then surely we ought to be told so." Will the authorities ponder on the way of telling?

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Ethical Religion: Its Historical Sources, Its Elements, Its Sufficiency, Its Future. By DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY. New York: American Ethical Union, 1943. 63 pp. 25¢.

These addresses by a leader in the Ethical Societies achieve a singular combination of simplicity, dignity, and depth which only experience and philosophy can beget, and which should make them a classic ex-

pression of a living faith. They reveal human faith naked, stripped of academic finery and theological padding—a dignified faith in human dignity. What makes this faith dignified, in addition to its prophetic simplicity, is its critical spirit. It is faith "resting on a pillow of doubt," for it seeks to profit by its critics and to see itself as enlightened by reason and history. In fact, Dr. Muzzey succeeds so well in grounding his faith in history and reason that a critical reviewer can do little more than to sharpen, for academic purposes, issues which are here stated with a clarity sufficient for purposes of ethical religion. What Dr. Muzzey means by ethical religion is evident enough in these pages, but what he says he means gives an opportunity occasionally for the fastidious student of religious thought to ask for more precision.

Ethical religion is conceived here as the opposite of supernatural religion. By supernatural religion is meant those "creeds and ceremonies" which pretend to be superhuman in origin or power. Ethical religion is, therefore, human religion, man's reverence for his ideals. The concepts "natural" religion and "naturalistic" religion are practically ignored, and the reason is simple: the religious faith here described is not, like Spinoza's, a naturalistic theology or creed, but a living energy, an expression of human interest. It is intended not as a scientific theology, but as a program for the spiritual life. As such, it is based on human "aspiration" and takes the natural environment and foundations of ethics for granted. Dr. Muzzey identifies ethics with the prophetic spirit, and the prophetic spirit is not the appeal to "Thus saith the Lord," but the spirit of "brave dissent." A prophet, according to Dr. Muzzey, is primarily an anticlerical reformer. The chief foe is conformity to creed and reliance on priestly offices. The chief positive element of faith is the belief that the sources of the good life are internal, not external to man's moral effort.

Dr. Muzzey admits that religion has appealed to man's emotions chiefly by "its imposing wealth of ceremony, its weight of tradition, and its claim to hold the key to the mysteries which confront every mortal (p. 30)." He contrasts this appeal with ethical religion's appeal to a combination of "intellectual integrity" and "moral imperative." His appeal is to the rational will. He takes for granted, too readily, that in the ethical or spiritual life, the appeal to the emotions is secondary, and that for persons liberated from supernaturalism, the rites of the

churches will be, as they were for Emerson, "an encumbrance instead of an inspiration." Spiritual life seems to him liberated when freed from them. The hunger and thirst after righteousness "itself is its own quenching. Unlike the body, the spirit thrives on what it longs for. 'What I aspire to be and am not comforts me.' Thus justice is advanced by the desire for justice, liberty is gained by the vision of liberty, righteousness is nourished by the craving for righteousness" (p. 19). Here there arises a question of fact: Is moral effort thus autonomous, feeding on itself, supplying its own resources? That Dr. Muzzey himself does not take this quite literally is suggested in a later passage, where he points out that the "free creative soul" is moved by "the impelling force of new insights which have come with the increase of knowledge" (p. 55). And he means here not merely moral knowledge, but ordinary "neutral," scientific discovery. If it is true that ethical striving is refreshed (to say the least) by new knowledge, it is no less true that it needs the support of the emotions as well. It is not true, literally, that the ethical life is one of "constant effort" nourished by effort. The same psychology that leads Dr. Muzzey to praise educational reform, ought to apply to his analysis of the spiritual life. The moral will does not operate on will power. Admitting for the present "the sufficiency of ethical religion," the real issue is whether the appeal to ethical motives is a sufficient resource for ethical religion. Virtue is seldom produced by preaching virtue.

Similarly, there is no good reason for assuming that the ceremonies of religion are not positive resources of ethical religion. In describing the ordinary piety of ordinary Catholics, Dr. Muzzey says, "It is enough for them to attend the services at stated times and to have the ministrations of the church to call upon in times of crisis, like birth, marriage and death" (p. 12). Now, admitting that such "services" may not be "enough," it is worse than illiberal to regard them as inimical to ethical religion. Dr. Muzzey expects each person to find "in his own soul" (p. 43) the resources for comfort and courage, and to this extent places little positive value on rites and rituals. To compel each person stoically to turn inward, when he might avail himself of social and institutional "services" is to sacrifice too much of religion to too little of ethics. Ethics is or should be the substance, the life-blood of religion, but it need not be religion's form or appearance. To identify substance and form is to rush into the arms of theology. To separate substance and form ab-

solutely is to conceive as independent a mysterious power and a pure mystery to the utter confusion of ethics. Dr. Muzzey falls into this old-fashioned way of thinking when he writes, "Ceremonialism is as adventitious to it [ethical religion] as cosmetics are to character" (p. 57). Cosmetics are no longer purely adventitious to character! And ceremonialism need not be to ethical religion.

If Dr. Muzzey had criticized ecclesiastical rites for creating a "harmony and peace" which is too "inner," which takes man out of his human relationships and cultivates a purely private satisfaction, there might have been more justification for his criticism. But he, too, seems at times to rely on an all too "inner" conception of spiritual life. Admitting that we are not "the masters of our fate," he claims, nevertheless, that we are "the captains of our souls" (p. 19), "the responsible architects of our own spiritual life" (p. 18). On the other hand, he emphasizes the doctrine that the good life must be pursued through right social relationships and calls attention to Dr. Adler's distinctive teaching that responsibility is a social, reciprocal matter, "eliciting in others, through all our contacts in family, vocations, business relations, political affiliations, and so forth, the worthy conduct which would in turn react upon us to strengthen our own faith in the potentialities of our nature" (pp. 41-42). And, in the last chapter, he makes much of the social nature of the ethical life, the need for "a new world in which hatred, rivalry, cruelty and war shall be replaced by love, co-operation, security and peace" (p. 53). To be schooled in "the discipline of moral responsibility" is more than "self-discipline." Similarly, ethical religion is more than being the captain of one's own soul; it is a "fellowship." In short, it is important for an ethical religion to be aware of its natural and social environments, even if they are "external." The social environment is really internal to the spiritual life on Dr. Muzzey's own presentation. According to orthodoxy, the place where men meet the Highest is holy ground. According to Ethical Culture, "the place where men meet to seek the highest is holy ground." To sanctify the "meeting house" is a significant advance in religious theory, and fits the practice of Christians and Jews better than their own theologies do. For, in practice, congregational meeting houses and synagogues, though not theoretically Houses of God or Temples, are in fact sacred places and central to religious life.

Would ethical religion suffer if it regarded the natural environment

as not quite so external as it has been represented in the tradition of ethical idealism? To extend the theory of religion a little further, to recognize the natural as well as the social habitat of religion, would give ethical religion an added dimension of piety without robbing it of its spirituality. Reverence, in other words, is more than reverence for the ideal; it is also recognition of the inevitable and submission to truth.

How creedless can faith be? Dr. Muzzey comes near the minimum of "rigid dogmas." I can detect only two, and even these he may be willing to submit to "human experience and relationships" for verification. There are four "elements" or "affirmations" of ethical religion, according to Dr. Muzzey: "the unqualified supremacy of the ethical end of life, strict intellectual integrity, the attribution of infinite worth to every individual as an irreplaceable member of the spiritual community, and the enhancement of that worth in others and in ourselves in our mutual intercourse in all of our human relationships" (pp. 33-34). Of these four articles in his creed, the first amounts to a definition. For by "the ethical end" he means, strictly speaking, nothing more specific than "the urge to the good life," which is not really a particular "supreme" end or *summum bonum,* but a phrase signifying the general loyalty to ideals. To believe, therefore, that "ethics is the supreme end of man" is not to believe a verifiable proposition, but to assert a truism and to define ethics in its broadest sense. Nor is this "supreme ideal" literally an "absolute, categorical imperative," for it does not originate in an external command, neither does it prescribe specific duties. It merely "affirms" our willingness to test religious beliefs and practices by their tendency to "promote right living"; and "right living" is not defined concretely. Such an "affirmation" is, therefore, less an article of faith than it is a definition or exhibition of ethics. Dr. Muzzey, however, introduces two propositions incidentally into his exposition of the ethical ideal, neither of which seems necessary to that ideal; perhaps it is because they sound like dogmas that he lays little emphasis on them. First, he suggests that ethical striving presupposes "fixed ends in every field of human enterprise" (p. 26). Does it? Is this not a dogmatic "affirmation"? If "fixed" does not mean "rigid" but merely "formal" finality, the dogmatism is purely methodological and relatively harmless, but Dr. Muzzey's exposition does not make it clear in what sense "fixed" is to be interpreted.

A second dogma appears in Dr. Muzzey's belief that "we are in harmony with an indefinable power that pervades the universe," and that this belief is "a necessary postulate for the conviction of the supreme ethical imperative in our own individual lives" (p. 28). Is this "indefinable sense" really "an inescapable datum in human consciousness"? If it is, it seems to me that we must conclude that "religious consciousness" involves more than "ethical elements," and that such "ethical religion" contains an element of theological creed. With these two exceptions, I think Dr. Muzzey's "elements" are rightly distinguished by him from creedal affirmations. For the second element (intellectual integrity) is clearly a virtue, not a belief; the third (attribution of infinite worth to each individual) is really a mode of defining (somewhat mythologically, to be sure) the nature of the infinite spiritual fellowship, which fellowship, in turn, is not an object of belief, but a name for the network of moral relationships; and the fourth (the enhancement of worth through fellowship) really makes explicit that this attribution of worth to the individual is not literally a datum for fellowship but the *modus operandi* of fellowship.

Dr. Muzzey's confidence that religion will become increasingly "ethical" in the near future seems to me well-founded. Whether or not it be true, as he asserts, that ethical religion is "the great common denominator in all the higher religions of the world, of which it has been in truth the creator" (p. 57), it seems probable that the "higher" religions will become increasingly conscious of their moral responsibilities and human foundations. This does not mean, and Dr. Muzzey does not predict, that religions will lose their individualities, or that a separate society of ethical religion will prosper. It means that "the area of human sympathy and understanding" will widen, that churches will be less national, and that no single religious organization will be able to claim to be *the* catholic religion; ethics is the measure of catholicity, and any religion becomes catholic to the extent that it becomes ethical. But I doubt whether it means, as Dr. Muzzey believes, that the religions will "dismiss meaningless ritual" and "concentrate only on preaching the gospel of the ethical obligations of man to man." On the contrary, it is quite possible that, as the ethical core of religion becomes more generally understood, there will be less need of preaching sermons like these of

Dr. Muzzey's and that rituals will achieve more meaning and emotional power. When religions have become more thoroughly ethical, they will be less than ever "the religion of ethics."

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Man the Measure. By ERICH KAHLER. New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1943. vii + 700 pp. $5.00.

In his writings on the theory of historiography, Benedetto Croce repeatedly points out that the time for "universal history" is past, and that the true historian will confine himself to monographs, that is, to a form adequate to the specific historical problems which alone are his legitimate task. *Universal history*, or the history of man as man, is not a topic of historiography. Not only does it lead beyond the earliest available records—and thus into mythography, no matter how enlightened in appearance—but its mythical form reveals the fact that its real topic is metaphysical, not historical. Its topic is the question as to the essence of man. To be sure, some answer to this question is needed as the solid foundation of any history worth reading, and any serious historian is giving an answer to it any time he carefully studies anything man does. For the essence of man is revealed in his deeds. In this sense, one can legitimately call man the measure of things human.

In this same sense, the best sections of Erich Kahler's book bring out the fact that, in our age, "the world situation is in itself revolutionary" (p. 631), because we are confronted with the alternative either of going to the bitter end of the modern crisis, or of resolving it. The book elaborates his thesis as to what the crisis of our age is, and how it came about. Thus, the book has the definite topic of a monograph, although its outward organization is that of a *universal history*, taking us from the Stone Age beginnings right down to the present.

The critic has no quarrel with the formal arrangement of a book, as long as the author knows what he is doing. But this reviewer is a bit uneasy, being unable to ascertain whether or not, for Kahler, the writing of a *universal history* is a deliberate means to the end of a clearer exposition of our crisis. There are signs which point to an affirmative answer. One third of the text sketches occidental history down to the

Reformation, two thirds expound the development since, and the emphasis is on the most recent times. On the other hand, the first third of the book, and even its earliest parts are written in the spirit of a general anthropology, and an unfavorable critic might conjecture that Kahler believes in the possibility of a final answer in these matters, that is, in the possibility of writing *universal history*. The truth is that, far from being comprehensive and encyclopedic, the universality of human history is humbly omnipresent.

To be sure, Kahler's early history of occidental man is not written in an encyclopedic, nor in a dogmatic vein. In fact, Kahler succeeds in turning his sketch into a simple invitation to the thoughtful reader to reconsider his already acquired knowledge of ancient and medieval history in the light of the general human development from primitive magic and "participation" toward tribal and national religion, and from there toward "world religion" (pp. 51 ff.). Kahler defines the latter as a relation of detached individuals to their God, whereas he sees in tribal and national religions a relation not depending on such personal decisions and crises as conversions, but a "natural" relation existing between man and God simply because the man is a member of his native group.

It is the thesis of the book that the breaking up of this group religion, which has been taking place ever since the time of Hellenism, leads at first to the formation of world religions and that, owing to the disintegration of such faith, as has happened in the occident since the Middle Ages, modern man has been lead into a position of individualistic solitude naturally accompanied by feelings of purposelessness and sceptical theories. The ultimate end of this development and its bitterest consequence Kahler finds formulated in the writings of an Ernst Juenger who, says Kahler,

> himself still knows about such luxuries as the meaning of existence and the dignity of man. He still knows about the Christian values, humanity, spirit, history. But he no longer wastes energy in combatting all that. He simply states that it no longer exists. He substantiates his claim by the picture of the young people who grew up after him and who no longer know anything about these things. These young people no longer belong to the anti-Christian era; neither can they be called really pagan. . . . They know nothing of a meaning of life and do not suffer consciously from the lack of this meaning (p. 596).

It is this thoroughly disillusioned youth which, in Germany, has furnished the real support of Hitler. But

> for them, national socialism has already become an old-fashioned, romantic movement with much too much ballast of slogans, urges, appetites, waste of energy. For them, national socialism is not sufficiently objective, cold and stream-lined. . . . Only formal technical achievement is objective enough, is real enough to satisfy them. And so in the world empire, they see nothing but a gigantic world record (p. 601).

Kahler quotes Juenger, who said that these young people represent "a combination of high organizational capacity and complete color-blindness toward values, faith without content, and discipline without justification." For them, "technics and ethics become, in a curious way, synonymous" (p. 596).

This then, we might say, is the face of Satan himself. And it is not necessarily a German face. Kahler gives an admirable history of the grounds and undergrounds of the specifically German collapse, and this reviewer warmly recommends the chapter on "Nihilism and the Rule of Technics" to anyone desirous to understand what has happened in Germany. These happenings, pursued back to the Middle Ages, are the monographic topic of Kahler's book. And this part of the book is no mere invitation to the reader to rearrange his antecedent knowledge of history; it is a solid piece of new historiography.

In the vein of *universal history*, Kahler adds a final chapter which might be entitled, Eschatology. To be sure, there is no trace of other worldliness in it. On the contrary, Kahler implies that salvation lies in the self-recognition of man as man, and he holds that such recognition must be furnished by the sciences. A scientistic eschatology is a rather dull thing. Eschatology as well as cosmology falls flat and shows no depth if torn from mythological contexts, and science cannot create mythology. We know that from Marx, and from Rosenberg.

The Protagorean title of Kahler's book is itself still an expression of the mythless loneliness of modern man, and so is Kahler's hope that "the sciences alone can furnish the picture of the whole, the teaching of the whole, on which man's mastery of his world depends" (p. 639). This very hope still marks a position such as Kahler himself describes as a "feeling of the exposure of the I to the universe," a "standing on nothingness and in nothingness" (p. 590). The scientistic hope is not suffi-

ciently Hyperborean, to borrow a word from Nietzsche, who, as Kahler reminds us, wrote up the last consequences of modernity, and who showed how, scientifically speaking, science itself is but a defense mechanism in the mind of man, or of certain men.

We can call man the measure of things human only in so far as man himself is measured by God or, less mythologically speaking, in so far as the conditional stands always under the judgment of the unconditional. And the unconditional is not something absolutely foreign, just as little as it is some merely present and conditional thing. Its presence is manifest in all history, and, in the great wealth of historical insight Kahler puts before us, the finger of God is most clearly discernible where Kahler least intends to theologize. Where he does theologize, it is in humanistic fashion.

Kahler's humanism seems to be the reverse of a Christian transcendence whose final historical consequence Kahler finds in the utter loneliness of modern man. The

> Christian God was an outward God, one who came to men, appealed to them in their quality of human beings only, and with whom men were connected by a bond of confidence, of beliefs only. This was, as European history proves, . . . a partial bond, that affects only a part of human existence, and that released human beings more and more into their profane, worldly, secularized lives (p. 156).

The true God is always the one who overcomes the demons, and he is manifest in the very recognition of the demons as such. In this sense, Kahler's history, like all genuine history, proclaims the forceless power of God, by means of the very insight into what is demonic in the historical process, and why. Furthermore, this insight furnishes the very power of historical movement, which is no mere sequence of events, but which moves because it gets something behind us.

Kahler is to be thanked, not only for almost uncountable flashes of illumination, nor only for the multitude of happy phrasings, but chiefly for helping us to get behind us the spirit of totalitarianism. He asks us to see it as the last result of modern loneliness for which "technics and ethics become synonymous" (p. 596).

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Roots of Bergson's Philosophy. By Ben-Ami Scharfstein. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943. viii + 156 pp. $1.75.

Whether the author is a great innovator or not—and Bergson is not—scarcely matters, as long as his philosophy is the final result of a convergence of ideas. . . . The very fact that we have had to look here and there in order to assemble what is amalgamated in Bergsonism, indicates a terminal system, one that characterizes a trend in the history of thought (p. 136).

There *are* relatively new ideas. But Bergson had no great share in originating any of the points he considered focal, except perhaps in *Matter and Memory*. His "originality" is a gift for synthesizing the theories of other persons (p. 138).

These are the conclusions to which the present investigation into the sources of Bergson's philosophy is led. And their interest is this: they reveal him as one of the master minds, one of the discoverers of an outstanding type of metaphysic. Surely this "gift for synthesizing" ideas suggested by many persons, which means the discovery of a new perspective of reality—every synthesis is the view of a whole from a certain angle—surely this is a truer because a greater originality than, for instance, the discovery of the laws of imitation or the depth of unconscious mind—ideas which Bergson himself took over from others. So we are indebted to Mr. Scharfstein for showing us wherein Bergson's eminence lies, for bringing out the seed-ideas from the conglomerate of French philosophy—whether or not consciously adopted from others by Bergson—which were clustered together to form the core of his thought. (The author prudently limits his problem to the sources that lie in recent French thought, "the immediate scientific and philosophic environs of Bergsonism" [p. 5].)

The first of the seven chapters defines the problem: to seek the roots of the "five broad-cut facets of his thought, his view of time, his theory of intuition, his psychology, his biology, and his morality or religion" (p. 6). The next five chapters take up these topics respectively in the order named. The last chapter, *Is Bergson Original?* states the conclusions at which the author arrives. A good bibliography of ten pages is added.

Chapter II, "The Root in Time," is the longest of the seven, quite properly we think, since Bergson's doctrine of time seems to so many his outstanding contribution. The writer points out a number of anticipations, or nearly such, of the qualitative *durée*. Here he draws on Tannery, Lachelier, E. Boutroux, Renouvier, Ravaisson, Balmes, Cournot, Delboeuf, Lotze, James, Ward, Fouillée, and Guyau, finding particularly

close similarities with Delboeuf, Fouillée, and J. M. Guyau. He even declares that "whether through such influence (of Fouillée on Bergson) or through an aura exhaled into French philosophy, or through the common possession of certain philosophic attitudes, Bergsonism is an historical continuation of Fouillée-ism" (p. 37). He concludes that the Bergsonian *durée* "was no cataclysmic insight for French philosophy" (p. 43).

Chapters III and IV, "The Root in Intuition" and "The Root in Psychology," are brief, fourteen pages each. The earliest French root of intuition is traced to Maine de Biran; Fouillée is found nearby, and the resemblance of Guyau and Bergson is here so close that we are given three pages of parallel columns quoted from each. To be sure, Guyau remains more of an intellectualist; identities we do not expect. The "depth-psychology" of Bergson stems from his early interest in hypnotism. The deep-lying unconscious self of Hartmann's philosophy was a central tenet for Ribot, and "Bergson incorporated a variant of it (Ribot's view) with his spiritualism and intuitionism" (p. 66). Nor was the theory of the persistence of memories in the unconscious a new one. Ribot had already stressed memory and process as central to mind. And Hughlings Jackson had anticipated Bergson's view that brain lesions are concerned only with motor response, not with consciousness itself. ". . . the depth-psychology evident in *Time and Free Will*, and doubly evident in *Matter and Memory*, are an almost direct result of Bergson's interest in French scientific psychology, in which Ribot was a path-breaker; . . . Bergson's conclusions on the body-mind relation, later to find wide sympathy, were not unanticipated" (p. 71).

Chapter V, "The Root in Biology," dwells chiefly on the vitalism of *Creative Evolution*. Some fifteen of the twenty-seven pages are given to the history of vitalism from Hegel and Schelling onward. In France, Ravaisson, Cournot, Delboeuf, and most of all Marin, foreshadowed Bergson. Marin wrote, "The essence of the organism is in an ascendant, progressive development pursued incessantly and everywhere" (p. 97), thus making explicit the note of growth which is more than just vitalism and is so prominent in Bergson. "Bergson's biology was not, we see, a palm-green oasis in a desert of mechanism and Darwinism" (p. 98).

Chapter VI, "The Root in Morality and Religion," presents us with the remarkable spectacle of a pure-blooded Jew whose thought developed from "its initial affirmation of freedom until its final glorifica-

tion of Christian mysticism and even beyond . . . to near-union with Catholic thought" (p. 102). Significant indeed! And puzzling—for Catholic thought is rationalist, and Bergson is always, as the author points out, an irrationalist (p. 135). Naturally we might expect to find in the *Two Sources,* written twenty-five years after *Creative Evolution,* some notable increment. What then? While the psychology of *Two Sources* "was prefigured in French spiritualism, a great new interest had intervened" (p. 115), namely the interest in religion, aroused by the Catholic revival of Thomism. And his doctrine of intuition opened the way to a religious mysticism. Here Bergson transformed the contemplative mysticism of Plotinus (to whom he acknowledged great debt) into an *active* mysticism. True, this had already been set forth by Delacroix and Evelyn Underhill, particularly the latter. Of her work the author remarks, "In so far as Bergson's theory of active mysticism had a single source, this is it" (p. 125). So, even though with no great novelty, Bergson came to see in the Christian mystics "the true exemplars of his own intuitionism" (p. 133).

From chapter VII, "Is Bergson Original?" we have already quoted, but it contains also a valuable comment on Bergson's attitude and method. He was empiricist in the best sense. He drew his results from the accredited results of the sciences: from biology, psychology, and sociology. Each of his four major books was written after years of study in one of these fields.

The interest of this work of Mr. Scharfstein we find unusual, and on the whole its theses seem to be sound. A meticulous student of recent history might detect flaws which we don't know enough to see; even so, the book is valuable, raising as it does the question, wherein does Bergson's eminence lie, and, we believe, showing correctly wherein it does lie. One caveat we may enter: we wish the author had laid more stress on the incremental note in *durée.* In chapter II there is only one explicit mention of it (p. 26); it comes out in chapter V, to be sure, but with little emphasis. Yet surely the unique significance of the *élan vital* doctrine is just this note of an inherent *progressive* tendency in life and mind. Herein *durée* differs from *merely* qualitative change. And did Bergson discover this alone, or was he consciously adopting or adapting the view of some one else?

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Twentieth Century Philosophy. Edited by DAGOBERT D. RUNES. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1943. 571 pp. $5.00.

Twentieth Century Philosophy is a book of twenty-two essays by eminent contemporary thinkers, giving a survey of present philosophical trends. The thinker states his case, "leaving it to the student," as the editor says, "to draw his conclusions and find or rectify his position." The editor is not without hope that "perhaps some day we may have cumulative philosophy as we have cumulative sciences. Perhaps. In the meantime it behooves the sincere friends of wisdom to go about their tasks and teachings with the tolerance which is the grace of true scholarship."

Since philosophy is not cumulative, the organization of a book such as this one must always present a problem. This being true, and moreover, since the essays, in not a few instances, are presentations of the thinker's point of view with no immediate thought of the student in mind, the book lacks a finished systematic character. Such a lack is not, however, necessarily to be regretted, for it is equally, perhaps more, important that the student come in touch with the eminent philosopher in his native haunts, absorbed in his own preoccupations.

As it then stands the book is divided into two parts, of which Part I contains essays on the main philosophic disciplines: "Ethics," by Tufts; "Aesthetics," by Parker; "Axiology," by Urban; "Philosophy of Law" (a reprint), by Pound; "Philosophy of History," by Boodin; "Philosophy of Science," by Lenzen; "Philosophy of Life" (a reprint), by Whitehead; "Metaphysics," by Hall; and "Theology and Metaphysics," by Mackintosh.

It is impossible to discuss systematically the contributions of the twenty-two essayists or of the nine of Part I. Suffice it, therefore, to make a few general remarks. In a not wholly dissimilar volume, *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jarhunderts* (1904), edited by W. Windelband, the same general topics were discussed, with two exceptions. Windelband's book contained no essays on Philosophy of Life and Axiology, though both topics were, of course, of interest to Windelband and the men associated with him, Rickert especially. Professor Urban remarks that "a notable character of the present situation in philosophy is the general use of the term 'axiology.' The delimitation of this special field is in itself of significance in any attempt to under-

stand and evaluate the present situation in what is called the theory of value." Philosophy of Life is another addition. In the face of some positivists who suggest that axiology is impossible altogether, and others (non-positivists and positivists) who might make both axiology or the philosophy of life comprehensive disciplines of which ethics, aesthetics, etc., are special disciplines, it is not yet assured what positions these disciplines will take in the future.

One other matter of general interest regarding Part I of the book must strike the reader. Whether by choice of the editor, by willingness on the part of the contributors to co-operate, or because the contributor was really the most eminent man in the field for the task (and hence a trend of the times might be indicated), four out of nine of the contributors—Urban, Whitehead, Hall, and Mackintosh—deliberately inject into their essays considered attacks upon positivism in its various forms. As for the other five, Tuft's essay does not explicitly deal with the foundation of ethical values, except to adopt the quasi-positivistic position of affirming with Dewey that value arises "out of the conditions of life." Parker, having affirmed that Philosophy of Art is "criticism of criticism," contents himself with discussing the problem of whether aesthetic experience is "unique" or a part of "ordinary experience," but he offers no definitive solution and does not raise the metaphysical issue. The theory of uniqueness can lead to metaphysics; the theory of "ordinary experience," he carries only as far as a general theory of value, without seeking further to ground it. Pound, after reviewing nineteenth century law, says, "Today in my judgment the most important problem which confronts the jurist is the theory of interests." The final step in determining the "scope and subject matter of the legal system" is to "work out principles of valuation of interest." Beyond this he does not go. Boodin builds up his theory of historical reality so as to overcome the dualism of matter and mind and to affirm that "reality is history" and that "change viewed in long perspectives indicates order." But when he views the apparent disorder of the world and history, the "enormous waste in order that life may go on" he falls back on faith that the striving which is accompanied by waste is "part of the cosmos, its urge in us. It is, I believe, its deepest urge." Lenzen, finally, takes the problem in his stride. "The significance of science resides in its value for practice and knowledge of reality." However, "it is not the task of philosophy of sci-

ence to construct a theory of reality in which the place of nature is defined. But it is appropriate to criticize the improper metaphysical employment of scientific ideas." Again, "the status of nature as an object of science is not determined by specific scientific doctrines." "A decision on the status of nature can be based, not on the results of science, but only on general considerations of the theory of knowledge." More proper is it to ask, "What is the ontological status of a universe of scientific discourse?" Lenzen refers to the instrumentalism of Lewis and Jordan, rejects Schlick's empiricism, discusses briefly Mach, Dingle, Dewey, and Helmholtz and closes judiciously with the remark, "Whether or not one concedes significance to the issue between realism and idealism, the cautious philosopher of science can limit himself to the concept of nature as a scheme for the systematic correlation of experiences."

Whatever be the attack on positivism on the grounds of its inherent logical weakness, its self-contradictory tendency to bootleg its metaphysics, there is no great rush, on the part of those who attack positivism, into metaphysical flights and achievement of socially embodied certainties. They deny positivism on principle but are cautious to a point of nicety. Hall's statement that metaphysics is more tentative than science is undoubtedly sound, but perhaps some corner ought to be found where boldness can have play, even at the cost of wrecking a few plates in the philosophical china shop.

Part II of the book is introduced by a reprint of Russell's essay, "Philosophy of the Twentieth Century" (still good reading except for his mere mention instead of discussion of Husserl). This is followed by essays on philosophical schools. Idealism is represented by two essays, on "Kantianism," by Ewing, and "Philosophy of Hegelianism," by Hoenigswald. Maritain, in an essay on "The Humanism of Thomas Aquinas," offers an apologia (virtually a sermon) and an appeal for Christian humanism rather than a reasoned statement of a philosophical position. Modern realism is represented by the reprinting of Santayana's "Transcendental Absolutism" and Montague's "The Story of American Realism." Reprinted also in Dewey's "The Development of American Pragmatism." There are essays of not altogether equal value on "Personalism," by Flewelling; "Phenomenology," by Farber; "Logical Empiricism," by Feigel; "Dialectical Materialism," by Somerville; and "Philosophical Naturalism," by Winn. Part II also contains a final essay

on "Philosophies of China," by Wing-tsit Chan, probably on the assumption that the average student may know something of modern Indian thought through Radhakrishnan and Muirhead's *Contemporary Indian Philosophy,* but has no comparable work available to him for China. Somerville adopts a novel approach to Dialectical Materialism. Instead of discussing it abstractly as a system, he relates it to the social scene of the Soviet Union and defends, not the system, but the adequate and fair study of it as a working philosophy in the Soviet Union, against the willful or ignorant neglect and distortion of it by ranking Western scholars. The result is an excellent and attractive piece of exposition of a living modern philosophy grounded in a new and thriving culture.

Having the systems before one in full array in their present representatives, one cannot help but get the impression that the mid-century is a period of considerable experiencing, with partially new, partially established ways of thought. At the turn of the century Kant was still the great figure. Through German idealism he had had influence not only in Germany, but beyond its borders in England and America. Realism and Pragmatism were lusty infants; they now possess the dignity of maturity, almost the venerability of age. Bergson was a great individual force; he is hardly mentioned in the present volume and certainly not as a continuing power. Phenomenology and Logical Empiricism are the driving forces of the day, but who can say whether they will become far-reaching influences or turn into cults without living up to their initial promise and bold claims. Dialectical Materialism (like Mark Twain) has been prematurely declared dead more than once, but continues alive fortified by a growing civilization that gives it a chance of being applied as gospel. Philosophical Naturalism, having outlived the metaphysical presumptions of scientists devoted to mechanistic materialism, is making its way with quiet persistence in a world of science, studying the role and limits of perception and conception in science, and of generalization, imagination, and criticism in philosophy. Though there are occasional backward glances toward masters of the past—Kant, Hegel, Aquinas—there is no dynamic and concerted "Back-to-Kant" or similar movement which seriously dominates philosophy as in the past, and the road to the future is a broad open highway.

The important work in philosophy rests solidly on modern discoveries in science, mathematics, and logic. While these discoveries are being

correlated or extended, there is no lack of interest or confidence in value and theories of value. Here however, as the articles of Urban, Pound and Winn indicate, philosophy is only in the hopeful or the trumpeting stage, but, except perhaps in Dialectical Materialism, no feeling of assurance of success or likely achievement has yet emerged to give impetus to any widespread, self-conscious, creative effort resting upon well conceived foundations.

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CRITICAL COMMENTS

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR LIEBERMAN

The Review of Religion, VIII (1943), 61-66, published my review of Professor Lieberman's book, *Greek in Jewish Palestine.* Now Professor Lieberman replies to my review in the March issue of the *Review* (pp. 320-23), but his reply cannot induce me to change any point of my criticisms, because Professor Lieberman's argumentation does not seem to me to be based on facts.

I shall, however, discuss only the first and the last remarks of Professor Lieberman's reply.

I declined to accept the historicity of an alleged Jewish academy of Greek wisdom in Palestine. Professor Lieberman's only source for this alleged academy is a hyperbole. Now I am told that I missed the point. While I refer to the historicity, Professor Lieberman speaks of the round numbers (500) contained in the hyperbole, thus shifting the reference from one point under consideration to another part of speech. My reference to a most recent (1938), excellent article on round numbers (from 3½ to 80000) is called superfluous, although it is a generally practiced custom not to ignore the work of other scholars. Professor Lieberman's reference to page 31, note 18, of his book does not make my reference superfluous, since the literature quoted on page 31 deals with the number 5, and it is, according to Professor Lieberman's own judgment, unsatisfactory!

Here is another example of Professor Lieberman's remarks which is typical of the manner with which my criticisms were dealt with.

Professor Lieberman says on page 323: "I shall be highly indebted to the reviewer if he will be able to show me some proof that *Rabbis* read the *Shema* in Greek. His [*sc.*, Wallach's] reference to the *Constitutiones Apostolicae* is irrelevant. The scholars [i.e., Bousset and K. Kohler] to whom he refers never said [neither did Wallach in his review!] that the Greek original of Jewish prayers was embodied in the above source." I am indebted to Professor Lieberman for the privilege extended to me to be of some help to him in this specific point, since there does not exist just "some proof" for his request but *the* proof *kat exochen.* Mishna *Sotah* VII, 1 reads: "These may be said in any language . . . the recital of the *Shema,* the *Tefilla,* etc." (see: *The Mishna,* tr. by H. Danby [Oxford, 1933] p. 300). From this passage I derive the undeniable evidence that the *Shema* could be read in Greek by anybody, which, of course, includes *Rabbis* too. I was startled by Professor Lieberman's request, because I read on page 59 of his book: "It is only natural that a preacher in a synagogue where *the Shema was read in Greek* [the italics are mine] quoted verses of the Bible accompanied by their standard Greek translations." Professor Lieberman does *not* give any source passage for the italicized words. It is indeed a riddle to me why Professor Lieberman did not refer to page 30 of his book, where another proof he is asking for is given by himself! According to the Palestinian Talmud, Tractate *Sotah* VII, 1 (ed. Krotoschin), fol. 21b, a certain R. Levi bar Hiatah, coming to

Caesarea, heard the Shema read in Greek, and he objected to it. But R. Jose told him that the Shema may be read in any language one knows. This, of course, includes Greek too.

The latter passage has been referred to already by Emil Schürer, *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (4th edition, 1909), p. 141, and by Hans Lietzmann, *Geschichte der Alten Kirche* I (1932), p. 85. Quite recently, an authority such as Professor Solomon Zeitlin stated in the *JQR*, XXXIV (1943), p. 340: "The reciting of the Shema in any language is proper."

In this connection, my reference to the Apostolic Constitutions cannot be put aside, not only because they preserve fragments of a Greek prayerbook of the Synagogue *not* referred to by Professor Lieberman in his book, but also on account of the democratic custom, generally adopted by the republic of letters, not to belittle the work of other scholars. After all, Bousset and Kohler are scholars of world renown. Furthermore, Arthur Spanier, in "Die erste Benediktion des Achtzehngebetes," (*MGWJ*. 81, [1937], 71-76), very ably made use of these fragments for the interpretation of the historical development of the Hebrew *Tefilla* text. Recently, A. Marmorstein, in "The Oldest Form of the Eighteen Benedictions," (*JQR*, XXXIV [1943], 137-59), dealt with a Greek papyrus find which sheds much light on the structure of the *Tefilla*.

Readers of the *Review of Religion* will find a *very* critical review of Professor Lieberman's book by G. Alon in the Hebrew periodical *Kirjath Sepher*, XX (Jerusalem, 1943), 76-95.

LUITPOLD WALLACH

The Dropsie College

BOOK NOTES

Palestinian Figurines in Relation to Certain Goddesses Known through Literature. By JAMES B. PRITCHARD. (American Oriental Series, Vol. 24.) New Haven, Conn.: American Oriental Society, 1943. 99 pp. 22 figs. $1.75.

This monograph catalogues the known terra-cotta figurines and plaques of a nude female figure found in the Palestinian excavations, and attempts to classify and interpret them. It is inevitable that one should look also beyond the boundaries of Palestine, and consider the similar types of objects found in other lands. This Dr. Pritchard has done in a very circumspect fashion. He has enjoyed the counsel of such men as Albright, Ranke, Speiser, and Wright in his ventures into the far-flung field of Oriental archeology, so that one can place great confidence in the statements made. Professor Pritchard distinguishes seven types of figurines: (1) the Qadesh type; (2) Hands holding breasts; (3) Arms hanging down to sides; (4) Archaic type; (5) Figurines holding disk; (6) Mother figurine; (7) Pillar figurine. The Qadesh type is the most distinctively Palestinian, but did not survive the Late Bronze period. The others are largely of Mesopotamian derivation, or influenced by Mesopotamian types.

There is a slight disparity between the title of Dr. Pritchard's study and its results, for, instead of its producing the expected identification of the figurines with goddesses known through literature, it arrives at a negative position in the matter. The discussion of the principal female deities of Palestine—Asherah, Ashtart, and Anat—will, however, be extremely welcome to students of Semitic religion and Old Testament scholars. (Let the interpreter of Hosea and Jeremiah take note!) A valuable appendix gives the references to these goddesses in the inscriptions, notably those of Ras Shamra. Dr. Pritchard deserves the gratitude of all those who have been puzzled by the problem of these figurines. His full presentation of the material, and sober, methodical discussion provide an excellent starting point for one's own speculations.

EMIL G. KRAELING

An Introduction to the History of Sufism. By ARTHUR J. ARBERRY. (The Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy Lectures for 1942.) London: Longmans Green & Co., 1943. xx + 84 pp. with four illustrations. Price in U. S. A. $3.00.

Owing to the world situation these lectures, by the Assistant Librarian at the India Office, were written in London and published there, though the lectureship on which they are given is in the University of Calcutta. The latter University is to be congratulated on the far-seeing policy which allowed the lectures to appear thus without being delivered in the traditional manner.

There is a lengthy, and rather dull Introduction, by Hassan Suhrawardy, the founder of the lectureship and brother of the Sir Abdallah whose name it bears, and three lectures: (1) "The Beginnings of Sufi Studies in Europe"; (2)

"The Second Phase: Goldziher to Massignon"; (3) "The Present State and Future of Sufi Studies"—followed by an Index. The four illustrations are concerned with the Suhrawardi connection.

Sufism is the form that mysticism takes in Islam. More exactly, Sufism is the mystical philosophy, and Dervishism is the mystical praxis, as these have been worked out within the framework of Islam. So from the title of these lectures we might have expected a study of that complex of movements of thought and of religious life that led to the development of a mystical philosophy and a mystical praxis in Islam. What the lectures contain, however, is a brief account of the rise and progress of studies on Sufism in Europe, from the first references to the "Sophians" in travellers' tales of the late sixteenth century, up to the work being done by living Orientalists at the present day, together with some account of the lecturer's own idea of the next steps to be taken in preparing the way for a future complete history of Sufism.

This story is not an uninteresting one, and for the general reader this little volume will be found to contain a great deal of information, both curious and instructive, on the course this particular branch of study has run in Europe for the last 300 years, as well as an appreciation of the work of some of the great masters, such as Goldziher, Nicholson, Massignon, and Asin.

The lecturer is curiously shy of the discipline of Comparative Religion as applied to mysticism, and expresses himself as desiring a truce to comparative studies "for at least a generation, so that meanwhile all possible energy can be concentrated upon the main task in hand, the only task appropriate to a thorough-going specialist, the description and analysis of Sufi doctrine and practice on the basis of Islamic sources and Islamic sources only." Now one may admit at once that excesses of ill-considered speculation in comparative mysticism have marred many studies on Sufism, from Tholuck's *Ssufismus sive Theologia Persica pantheistica* onwards, and, indeed, that certain students in this field who are still active have laid themselves open to serious criticism in this respect. Yet, on the ground of scientific method, the technique of the thoroughgoing specialist mentioned above, it seems to the present reviewer, as it seemed to the late Professor Bersträsser of Munich, as little reasonable or profitable to study Sufism apart from the matrix of Christian mysticism (strongly colored by Neoplatonism on the one hand, and by Iranian thought on the other) in which it had its birth and its early development, as it would be to study Jewish eschatology solely on the basis of Jewish sources, or early Christian iconography solely on the basis of Christian sources. Indeed, in Lecture III, the author himself seems to feel the necessity of thus setting Sufism into its original environment.

Looking to the future, the lecturer, as one might expect from a pupil of R. A. Nicholson, rightly insists that our prime need is texts. A history of Sufism can only be written on the basis of reliable texts, and while our libraries contain abundance of MS material of the utmost importance from all ages of Sufism, the number of properly edited texts can almost be counted on the hands. After

texts, perhaps the two great desiderata are detailed studies of individual figures in the Sufi tradition, on the style of Massignon's study of al-Hallaj, and investigation of the individual Dervish Orders in which the praxis of Sufism has been embodied generation after generation. The field that opens before younger scholars is thus immense, and this little book can well be recommended to them as a stimulus for their task.

A. J.

What Is the Church Doing? By Henry P. Van Dusen. New York: Charles Scribners's Sons, 1943. xii + 194 pp. $1.00.

Even in these days of rapid travel around a shrinking world, not many have had the opportunity to see at close range the widespreading work of the Christian churches, or to know at first hand the personalities involved not only in the world mission but in the battle against totalitarianism.

The author, who is Roosevelt Professor of Systematic Theology in Union Theological Seminary, has many links with organized world Christianity and thus enjoys a dual vantage point as both a scholar and an active leader.

In the book under review, Dr. Van Dusen assembles representative facts from the churches in many of the thirty lands where they have lost their liberty and are forced to fight on unequal terms against a dominating pagan totalitarianism, which is set to destroy their influence and usurp their place in the shaping of human wills.

He reports his observations of the missionary activity by which the Church has become, in the present century for the first time, actually world-wide—actually the *only* world-wide fellowship in existence.

He deals with the world Church, now beginning to be conscious of itself in new and significant ways, and views critically its yesterdays and its morrow—adding notes on the problem of Church union from an empirical and historical viewpoint.

The material assembled in this brief volume avowedly represents a sampling of the mass of facts now known to the well-informed few. But they are highly revealing of the struggle going on behind headlines which have awakened even the un-churched to the fact that instead of being dead, the Christian Church is the livest thing inside Axis lands and the most effective center of resistance to the disease of Nazism, the one most realistic hope of any spiritual integration of a tragically divided world.

Although it suffers from the effects of very great condensation and a high degree of selectivity, the net effect of Dr. Van Dusen's survey is good. It is in perspective, it is factual; much of it rests on firsthand observation, and all of it is documented. He ends with a note of hope which is based on more than wishful thinking.

Henry Smith Leiper

The Church and Psychotherapy. By Karl Rue Stolz. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1943. 312 pp. $2.50.

At the time of his death in March, 1943, the author was Dean of the Hartford School of Religious Education. The present volume, published posthumously, contains the conclusions which he had reached as a result of long practical experience and extensive writing in the field of pastoral and religious psychology.

In the introductory chapter, Professor Stolz expresses his conviction that it is important for the church and psychotherapy to co-operate, without forgetting certain distinctions between them. He then devotes three chapters to a discussion of the healing ministry of Jesus, and the remainder of the book is given over to an examination of the respects in which the Church and psychotherapy may be said to be working toward similar ends, with techniques which can be brought increasingly into harmony with each other. Chapters IX, X and XI, on "The Therapeutic Function of Preaching," "Christian Education and Personality Development," and "Vocational Neuroses of the Minister," are especially penetrating and helpful.

The book makes a welcome contribution in a promising area where a great deal of co-operative work between ministers and psychotherapists needs to be done. Most ministers who read it will be gratified to discover that it neither "goes off the deep end" in reducing everything religious to purely psychoanalytic terms, nor does it engage in defensive parries against psychoanalysis for the sake of safeguarding religious interests. It concentrates constructively upon the respects in which the work of the church always has sought to be therapeutic, and can be implemented today by developments in the practice of clinical psychology.

The author serves his own purpose best by refraining from theoretical discussions of either a theological or psychological kind. Nevertheless, the book has some serious shortcomings which, unfortunately, are also to be found in most of the literature on pastoral psychology. These can be summarized by saying that from the standpoint of a practicing psychotherapist—even one favorably inclined toward religion—the conception of therapy set forth is bound to seem amateurish and, in some respects, outmoded. To be more specific, Professor Stolz repeatedly takes for granted a procedure which involves imposing obligations, and which places the responsibility for "furnishing the answers" largely on the minister's shoulders. Most practicing analysts have discovered, whether they like it or not, that such techniques are incompatible with the best results. Moreover, the author cites several cases (e.g., on p. 77) where the "solution" arrived at was merely an external device, and he apparently fails to realize that it could not have gone to the roots of the character structure of the individual concerned. One might reply that the pastor's role makes it necessary for him to impose certain conditions which the therapist would not. But, if this is the case, it raises a central problem concerning the extent to which the functions of the pastor and the therapist can be combined; and one of the most disappointing facts about *The Church and Psychotherapy* is that it does not face this problem.

Perhaps no man can be blamed because he has not achieved equal expertness in two vocations, either of which demands the skill and devotion of a lifetime. Certainly Professor Stolz has performed a positive service in exploring the many points of connection which already exist between the church and psychotherapy, and he has cleared the ground for further co-operation, both by his attitude of mind and by his own research. In fact, he would have been the first to affirm that the whole subject calls for fearless pioneering, and that the task to which he gave a major portion of his useful life can be carried through only by pooling the resources of many experts and by patiently working through the problems which are as yet unsolved.

D. E. R.

Victory over Fear. By JOHN DOLLARD. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942. 215 pp. $2.00.

People are gradually discovering that personal problems must be dealt with through the perspective gained by relating apparently irrelevant events to the immediate issue. In this book a method of such systematic introspection, called "self-study" is described. Fear, according to the author, is to be conquered by understanding. The perspective of enlarged understanding can obviously contribute much to readjustment. It is equally obvious, however, that the end result will be in keeping with the framework of values that enlarged understanding has in view. It is at this point that the whole discipline acquires religious significance. Here the author avoids carrying to an appropriate conclusion the philosophy of his not unfruitful method. In so far as the generic aim of religion is the promotion of devoted living, this effort must be considered irreligious or even anti-religious. Against the value of deeply devoted and trustful living is persistently set the alleged importance of getting what one wants. The author's kind of "understanding" is inadequate for a scheme of life in which "perfect *love* casteth out fear."

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

Mysticism in Modern Psychology. By CHARLES CARLÉ. New York: Psychosociological Press, 1943. 47 pp. $1.00.

The author qualifies mysticism as the pseudo kind that savors of charlatanism. His purpose is to conquer "quackery in applied psychology," and he singles out as examples psychoanalysis and the Rorschach technique. There is a medieval chapter on "Freud's Revival of the Devil Incarnate." The devil is Freud's concept of the unconscious mind and the author speaks of "cabalistic dream interpretation" as the peak of Freud's "fantastic mysticism." The reviewer feels like an accessory after the fact, since the author does him the honor of designating his study, *Telepathic Dreams*, as "the straight continuation of Freud's mystic line."

Fifty years ago, when the tocsins first rang in alarm against psychoanalysis, the musty flavor of Carlé's treatment of the subject would not have been noted.

Today, as Rip Van Winkle *redivivus,* he shines because the mildew in his beard catches the light.

Carlé's arguments are based on the original Freudian concepts and technique. Apparently, he never heard of Stekel's dynamic analysis which reduces the treatment from years to a few months, and which has prominent advocates in America. He wields a heavy bludgeon against Freud's anti-religious attitude, and is unable to see how much room there is in analysis for the totally opposite view that it is not religion, but rather the absence of religion, that makes the race neurotic.

Admittedly, the original Freudian foundations permit of criticism. Why does Carlé think that nothing in them has changed, and that psychoanalysis is immutably bound to the original findings? Because of this limitation his arguments are of interest mainly to the antiquarian. One cannot but smile at such claims as that "psychoanalysis gives only a distorted, pseudo-mystical insight into human nature," or that the "use of psychoanalysis leads nowhere to a clarification of our personal, economic or political problems."

Searching for possible motives for this obtuse attitude, on page 42 the reviewer discovers the suspicion of a Catholic bias, and the invocation of the devil suddenly assumes a new meaning. The reviewer wonders why the author had not frankly stated that the trouble with Freud is not his mysticism but rather the absence of it. It would render easier the search for the spiritual instruments with which to solve the crying psycho-sociological problems of our age. Since the author confesses to the bankruptcy of applied psychology, a little less hectoring about psychoanalysis, the Rorschach methods and personality tests, and a little more moderation in the choice of epithets would have made his pamphlet more acceptable.

NANDOR FODOR

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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